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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Diane Theresa Volk, for the Master of
Arts in History presented April 26, 1976.
Title:

The Circulation of Elites in Twentieth Century American History:
The New Deal as a Case Study.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Reviewing the scope and credibility of C. Wright Mills' provocative
study, The Power Elite, for a seminar on U. S. in the Sixties prompted my
interest in the validity of assessing the historical process by means of
the elitist perspective.

This coupled with my belief that the New Deal

era ushered in a new chapter in the political history of the United States
precipitated an investigation of the elitist perspective and how that
perspective illuminated the conditions of historical change effected by
the New Deal.
To develop this theme of the credibility of the elitist interpretation
of history generally and its particular implications for New Deal
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historiography, I undertook a thorough .investigation of the works of
the writers of the elitist school of thought around the turn of the last
century.

The central assumption underlying this intellectual discourse

is that in any society there is a distinction between those who rule and
those who do not.

It encompasses all aspects of society, not just in the

political sphere which makes for ready analysis and investigation.

It

has, by narrowing the historical perspective under inquiry, facilitated
the understanding of social change by viewing it as the process of
the circulation of elites into ruling positions as th·is circulation is
reflective of the transfonnations taking place within society.
In order to assess the operation of this perspective within democratic
societies, and more particularly within the United States, I examined the
process of elite rule in the United States.

My investigation prompted

the conclusion that within the constructs of a procedural democracy
which operates via the political vehicles of fixed, competitive elections,
rights of political association, and the freedoms of speech and press,
elites are .at least nominally held in check as to the extent of their rule.
Because of· this, it is highly improbable that blatant violations by the
elite of democratic traditions would occur in an open society claiming
democratic techniques of rule.

Although the dictates of the procedural

democracy in operation in the United States modify the behavior of its
elites, they .do not undermine the viability of the elites to rule.

What

has seemed peculiar to the American tradition of elite rule is that the
circulation of elites is characterized by a gradual and non-violent
process--the process being triggered by the existing elite's ineffectiveness to meet the challenges of the times.
In determining the extent to which elite circulation effected the
contours of the New Deal program, I focused on the implications of the
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mobilization of social scientists and intellectuals within the federal
government.

This inquiry illuminated several factors:

l) that this

mobilization was to a large extent the culmination of the federal

government's growing reliance on the institutes of social science during
the Twenties; 2) that this new mobilization was. largely instrumental
in the formulation of the New Deal program which established the welfare
state; and 3) with the Reorganization Act of 1939, this new mobilization
was secured of a permanent place in the federal bureaucracy.
Viewing the New Deal within the parameters of tteelitist perspective,
one is able to discern the transitional role it played between the political dictates of an earlier era and the political demands of the modern
age.

The Thirties marked the evolution in the federal government from its

traditional role of arbitrator or regulator of the nation's infrastructures
to that of guarantor of the social and economic order.

The Great Depres-

sion had precipitated this demand for the enlarged responsibilities of
the federal government, and the New Deal facilitated the transition.
Central to this process of change and transition, which characterized
the scope of the New Deal, was the circulation into the federal government of a new elite of academics and social science orientated intellectuals.
Their impact was significant in terms of the legislation initiated, and
enacted, the added dimension of social planning and social research
within the federal government, and the restructuring of the administrative
network of the federal 9overnment with the Reorganization Act of 1939.
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CHAPTER I
I NT RO DUCT ION
Revisionism plays a vital role in any scholarly discipline,
especially history.

Without the addition and assimilation of new

thinking, opposing interpretations, or conflicting ideas, the significance
of the academic professions would be greatly diminished by the stagnation of outmoded theories and explanations.

On the other hand,

unsubstantiated theories and wild guesses or speculations are hardly
welcomed, since they tend to undermine th.e credibility of the disciplines.
Nevertheless, the constant questioning of the current"standard 11 works
in 1ight of new data or novel interpretations substantiated by research
is the life blood of scholarship.
Interpreting recent history offers a unique challenge to any
scholar.

At times one's perspective is clouded by presentism and

objectivity is lost.

But if all subjectivity is subordinated to the goal

of strict objectivity, the spirit of the time in question can also be
forfeited.

This double jeopardy, however, does not completely cripple

the viability of historians of the recent past.

The study of modern

history offers unique advantages not afforded scholars of distant eras.
Witnessing the constantly expanding field as new data surfaces, the
chronicler of "modern" times must frequently rewrite and redevelop even
the most elementary assumptions of his era--thus spending much time within
the framework of revisionism.

It is here where many of the creative

aspects of writing history are realized.
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The first definitive historical work on Franklin Roosevelt's New
Deal has yet to be written, because researchers are still anticipating
the emergence of additional data to enlarge the historical record.
I

Before such a study is submitted to the profession, I would like to propose for further investigation a largely untapped area within this era-an analysis of the domestic New Deal as shaped by the emergence of a
new elite.
Since the publication of C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite in 1956,
there has been much debate in the intellectual community over the aptness
or indeed the credibility of Mills' conceptualization of American
society. 1 ·Many social scientists have adopted and adapted his themes
of the virtually unchecked power of an elite that directs and molds
the political, economic, and military direction of American society in
order to reanalyze much, if not all, of the history of the United States.
Hindsight allows the scholar the advantage to see how history unfolds,
but it is not a tool to set up casual relationships--a tactic employed
by many historians to forge extended threads of continuity between
periods which provides for a highly monistic view of history.

The

elitist perspective offers a wide-range of research possibilities,
since its basic hypothesis of minority rule 2 illuminates a condition
or state of affairs that may be found in any society at any given time.
But it is not a complete theory of history and should not be taken as
such:
Although the elite perspective provides insight into
historical change, social stability, stagnation, and even
decay, it is by no means a complete theory of history.
History maY have a single ultimate efficient cause, such as
class conflict, or more likely, it may be shaped by a variety
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of factors, such as belief systems, biological determinism,
technological conditions, heroes in history, and fortuitous
circumstances. Elite theory cannot tell us what finally
accounts for the movement of history, and probably no
general theory ever will. But elite theory is consistent
with various perspectives on historical causation and can
itself add considerably to our understanding.3
Given these guidelines, the elitist perspective can enlarge the
historical scope of study, but taken in a dogmatic fashion it can also
completely distort the historical record.

Even Mills, a major proponent

of elite studies, warned against such a dogmatic approach to history
and the need for scholars to define specifically the elite groups
under investigation:
It is not my thesis that for all epochs of human history
and in all nations, a creative minority, a ruling class, an
omnipotent elite shapes all historical events. Such statements, upon careful examination, usually turn out to be mere
tautologies, and even when they are not, they are so entirely
general as to be useless . . . . If we insist that the elite
be defined as a strictly coordinated class that continually
and absolutely rules, we are closing off from our view
much to what the term more modestly defined might open up
to our observation. In short, our definition of the power
elite cannot properly contain dogma concerning the degree
and kind of power that ruling groups everywhere have. Much
less should it permit us to smu~gle into our discussion a
theory of history.4
Extreme dogmatic approaches to history via elite theory usually uncover
11
.

a conspiracy of an easily located set of villians 115 which undermines

the validity of approaching history from an elitist viewpoint.

To

analyze how shifts in the power structure of society present opportunities for various elites and how they respond to the challenges is not
to indicta set of 11 villians, 11 but rather to attempt to understand how
power changes affect society at a given period of time.

11

Witchhunting

is not the task for historians, and to use the profess ion for this

11
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purpose detracts from its standing among the social sciences.

Because

elite theory is a susceptible target for such a purpose, great care must
be taken when utilizing this perspective as a mode of historical inquiry.
One of the basic tenets of the elitist perspective is that in all
societies rule is executed by a minority, a ruling class.

It is not only

the pinpointing of this minority that is important for the elaboration
of the elitist perspective.
the given

~lite

With an analysis of the factors that perpetuate

groups--the elite consensus, selection, mobility, and

circulation--the historian can piece together more accurately a broad
overview of the period under investigation.
The ,main purpose of this study is to analyze the incorporation of
a new political class of social science orientated intellectuals in
government service during the New Deal period.

Their inclusion exem-

plified the circulation of a new elite which had its origins in the newly
founded institutes of social science during the Twenties.* As the
viability of social science as a means to analyze and resolve the problems
of modern society increased throughout the Twenties, the different
branches of government began to utilize these 11 technicians 11 of social
science in various capacities in order to meet the organizational demands
of the new tndustrial age.

At first such consultations between the govern-

ment and the intellectual conmunity were brief and short-lived, but by

*Elite circulation is explained in greater detail in Chapters 2
and 3, but a brief definition of it is the process whereby elite powerholders are replaced by a new elite reflecting a new elite concensus
shaped by social and economic transformations within the system.
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the end of the New Deal a permanent mobilization of academics and social
science orientated intellectuals had been established in Washington.
This phenomenon, its roots and its implementation into the top-level
channels of national policy-making, is the focus of this work.
Because a thorough understanding of the elitist perspective is an
integral facet of this proposed study, the following two chapters deal
exclusively with elitist thought.

Its conceptualization and its

modern formulation around the turn of the last century by such scholars
as Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and others is the
subject of Chapter Two.

Similarly the focus of Chapter Three deals

with the application of elite theory to democratic societies in general
and to the United States in particular.

This information, although brief,

will help to familiarize readers with the major factors and assumptions
of elite theory.
An examination of the roots of the new political elite of
academics and intellectuals is the primary concern of Chapter Four.
The emerging power and viability of this elite is traced to the rise of
the institutes of social science during the Twenties which advanced the
methodology of social science as well as its application to solving
the social disorders of the enlarging industrial society.

By the end

of the Twenties this newly emerging political elite was recognized and
recruited in modest numbers by the federal government to staff various
coR111issions and coR111ittees for the gathering of social intelligence needed
to formulate national policy.

In this manner, this rising political

elite made its initial penetration into the thresholds of national
decision-making.
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Franklin Roosevelt, in his attempts to reverse the economic
dilemmas of the depression, mobilized this elite in
the program of the New Deal.

\~ashington

to formulate

The wholesale recruitment of this new elite,

its influence in writing most of the significant legislation of the New
Deal, which both expanded the scope of federal responsibility to the
social and economic well-being of the nation and established the welfare
positive state, and its adaptability to the political context of the
federal bureaucracy comprises the primary focus and analysis of Chapter
Five.
An analysis of the reorganization of the executive branch of the
federal government during the latter half of the Thirties is the emphasis
of Chapter Six.

This endeavor, encouraged and implemented by the new

· elite of academics and intellectuals, is investigated both in terms of
the advancement of the efficiency of administration and of the establishment of permanent positions in the channels of national policy-making
for this new elite.

With the implementation of the Reorganization Act

of 1939, the new elite became implanted in the federal government--the
cycle of elite circulation complete.

Closing remarks and conclusions

complete the Seventh and final chapter.
It is hoped that this study of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal will
enlarge the present scope of New Deal history by placing it within the
historiography of revisionism which plays a vital role in the expansion
of historical understanding.

ENDNOTES

lsee G. William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard, C. Wright Mills
and the Power Elite (Boston, 1968), for a representative survey of
the debate over Mills' Thesis.
2Elite Theory holds that in all societies rule is carried
out by a small minority which constitutes the ruling class. See
H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New Yark, 1958), pp. 250255; James Burnham; The Machiavellians (New York, 1943), pp. 2-8;
and Harry K. Girvetz, ed., Democracy and Elitism (New York, 1967),
pp. 30-35.
3Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites (New York,
1973)' p. 232 .
. 4c. Wright Mills, The ,Power Elite (New York, 1956}, p. 20.
51bid., p. 21.

CHAPTER II
ELITE THEORY

The Aristotelian methodology of political classification 1
dominated to a large degree the political sciences up until the advent
of the elite theories of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries,. 2 With the formulations of the elitist perspective concerning
the nature and structure of ruling classes·, the ancient Aristotelian
assumption pf political classification no longer maintained its almost
universal appeal.

Whereas ' Aristotle distinguished differing political

systems by separate classifications, the proponents of the elitist
school of thought asserted that all forms of government were actually
dominated by a select mino.r ity:

11

{Ti/ all societies rule is inevitably

exercised by a minority, a ruling class.

This is as true under a
.

so-called democracy as under any other form of government. 11

3

With

the establishment of credibility of this assertion, new avenues of
understanding and analysis were opened up to the social scientists of
the modern era.
The major advocates of the 11 Machi avell i an 114 school of thought-Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels--are not considered
"in terms of wide-ranging imagination and a sophisticated understanding of
the categories of social thought 115 as the key political thinkers of
the early twentieth century.

Nevertheless the novel and narrow focus

of their work gave it an irrmediate as well as a lasting dialetical
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influence on the intellectual community.

In particular these writers

formulated in a manifest scientific design "the newly rediscovered pol itical doctrines that

So~l

and Spengler enunciated in intentionally provoc-

ative fragments, 116 and the work Machiavelli had attempted centuries earlier.
Building upon these foundations, the elitists constructed a theoretical
framework which eventually included in its scope all social sciences.
The intellectual climate of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries also contributed largely to the backgrounds of the
elitist writers.

The dictates of positivism, which provided the key to

the establishment of the modern social sciences, were widely shared and
advocated among social and political writers:
All were, in varying degrees, animated by the conviction
that the study of society could be advanced if its practittoners succeeded in assimilating the spirit and general methods
employed in the more 11 exact 11 sciences. By means of observation,
classification of data, and testing, social phenomena could ~e
made to yield "laws" predicting the future course of events.
This, coupled with the concept of organization which preoccupied
theorists of this period, 8 advanced social inquiry in new directions:
The organizationists looked upon society as an order of
functions, a utilitarian construct of integrated activity,
a means for focusing human energies in a combined effort . .
. . Organization also signified a method of social control, a
means fo~ imparting order, structure, and regularity to
society.
,
Within this framework of scholarship dominated by a positivist tradition
of methodology and a preoccupation with the organizational aspects
and potentials of society, the elitist writersfell heir to the
Machiavellian tradition.
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Centuries earlier at the beginning of the scientific age,
Machiavelli, an Italian political scientist, through the course of
several works, namely Discourses on Livy and The Prince, sought
to free the study of politics from ethics which had been interdependent
from the time of Aristotle and which had dominated Medieval political
thought. 10 In divorcing politics from its ethical base, Machiavelli
substituted a scientific method in his analysis of politics for the
purposes of attaining an objectivity which is essential to all sciences.
In the course of his study, Machiavelli ·established a methodology which
was to bind his. writings and theoretical formulations.

Concerning

this methodology, James Burnham, political theorist, convnents:
. . . in the first place, we find that Machiavelli uses
language in a cognitive, scientific manner . . . . Second,
Machiavelli delineates with sufficient clarity the field of
politics . . . . Third, Machiavelli assembles, and with some
measure of system, a large number of facts: facts drawn
from his reading in the historical works available to him,
from what others, prominent in the politics of his own
day, have told him, and from what he himself has observed
during his own active political career . . . . Fourth, Machiavelli
is always attempting to correlate sets of facts into generalization or laws . . . . Finally, though this is not strictly
part of the logic of scientific method, we feel everywhere
in Machiavelli . . . an intense and dominant passion for the
truth.11
In such a manner Machiavelli defined politics as the struggle for
power among members of society. 12 His intensive methodology resulted
in tte observation that within society there are two types of "political
man"--the "ruler-type" and the 11 ruled-type 11 •

These prototypes of

political man became the focal point of his political science which
sought to generalize those characteristics peculiar to each type of

ll
political man and to extend these generalizations into a general
hypothesis on the nature of political organization.
The "ruled-type," according to Machiavelli, comprises the great
majority, its chief characteristic being political passivity.

Unless

driven by the most extreme provocation on the part of the rulers or
by rare and extraordinary circumstance, the ruled are not interested
in power.

They want a minimum of security, and a chance to live
their own lives and manage their concerns. 13 In contrast, the
characteristics of the "ruler-type" have ambition, drive, and spirit-the qualities which perpetuate rule during difficult times. 14 War and
fighting train the potential rulers, and when once in power, the ruler
can then secure his reign on the basis of force.

More important than

force, however, is fraud which Machiavelli attributes as an indispensable
characteristic of the viable "ruler-type." With fraud the ruler can
continue in power by manipulating both potential rulers and the ruled.
\

Superceding all these factors as an essential ingredient for lasting
rule is skill at adapting to the environment of the times as "neither
cruelty nor humaneness, neither rashness nor caution, neither liberality
nor avarice avails in the struggle for power unless the times are suited. 1115
With these observations of political man, Machiavelli started an unfinished
chapter in political science guided by the precepts of the scientific
tradition.

Lacking the methodology to procure a highly systematic

theory transcending the limitations of any one social science, Machiavelli,
nevertheless posed questions which eventually formulated a cross-disciplinary
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elitist school of thought among the social sciences of the twentieth

century.
Two writers, forshadowing the emergence of

t~e

neo-Machiavellian

school of thought, Georges Sorel and Oswald Spengler, contributed an
array of scholarship to the intellectual corrvnunity which advanced in
fragmentary form conceptualizations later developed by the elite theorists.
Georges Sorel, a self-educated French critic of European degeneracy,
writing at the turn of the last century, envi.sioned a society devoid of
the false . hopes and promises imbued by the successive liberal revolutions
since 1789 and the chaos imposed by man's harsh encounter with the
industrial age. 16 The ancient classical world provided Sorel with
a source of inspiration for a new schema which would transform the
degenerate contemporary society into a renaissance of heroic grandeur.
La Ruine du Monde Antique, the product of his study of the ancient
world, sunmarized the general formulations of his schema.

He asserted,

by means of tracing western civilization through three cyclical
ascending and descending phases, that the absence of struggle or conflict in society was the key causal factor in decline. 17 According
to Sore 1, the absence of struggle or conflict in society presupposes
a decline in decisiveness, a loss of civic duty, the roots of widespread degeneration which is "accelerated by the questioning of
rationalism; a malady of reflection and self-analysis paralyzes the
will to action. 1118 What was needed in contemporary society, then, was
the source of conflict with which men could identify and by which the
age could be sustained.

The proper regulation of this conflict,

theorized Sorel in his later works, especially Reflections on Violence,
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would bring back a heroic age of grandeur.

This regulation of conflict

would be achieved by the utilization of the political myth:
Experience shows that the framing of a future, in some
indeterminate time, may, when it is done in a certain way,
be very effective, and have few inconveniences; this
happens when the anticipations of the future take the
form of those myths, which enclose with them, all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party or of a class,
inclinations which recur to the mind with the insi~gence
of instincts in all the circumstances of life . . .
What was implied was the creation of an elite class whereby the leaders
of society were characterized by their ability to "captivate and galvanize" the masses via the myth.

"The useful lie serves to direct

men into action and at the time create the basis of leadership ...
Sorel's was an elitism based neither on social status nor intellectual
achievements, but on the abilityto sustain and arouse passions. 1120
Though Sorel exposed these ideas of non-logical action and mythmanipulation, he lacked the skill to translate his ideas into a
coherent theory.

"His 'diremptions' and 'myths' offered the elements

at least of a more cohe.rent theory.
together. 1121

But he was unable to fit the pieces

The opposite was the case for Oswald Spengler whose

extreme tendencies pushed the logic of his conceptualizations to their
furthermost limits. 22
Spengler, a German speculative historian at the turn of the
last century, asserted throughout the course of his work, which culminated
with The Decline of the West, that definite laws of growth determine
history and that consequently history is predictable. 23 This stance,
based on the notion of cycles, appeared as a recurrent theme in the
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scholarhsip of this period, but never in such a dogmatic fashion as
to formulate such a theory of history.

As one critic wrote:

The Decline of the West marked the full formulation of a
cyclical theory of historical change and a comparative
approach to the study of culture which had gradually been
establishing themselves among the implicit presuppositions
of early twentieth-century social thought. The notion of
cycles had underlain Sorel's respect for the values of a
simpler age and his skepticism about the "illusions of
progress." It had figured more explicitly in Pareto's
hypothesis of an alteration between periods in which
"persistence of aggregrates" was dominant and thos2
in which the instinct for combinations" held sway. 4
Though cyclical theory found its way into the formulation of elitist
theory, it provided merely a factor within the overall framework and
never a determinist overview of the course of all human history.

Such

was never the work of the elite theorists whose utilization of the
concepts of .social change and continuity within the context of elitism
would be for the purpose of expanding historical understanding,
not to delimit it further with a theory of history.

Nevertheless,

in modest degree, the Spenglerian influence has become an integral
ingredient in elitist thought.
A trio of neo-Machiavellians, Gaetano Mosca,

Robert Michels, and

Vil fredo Pa re to, shaped these fragments of i nte 11 ec.tua l thought into
a theoretical formulation of elitism.
As speculative sociologists Pareto and Mosca and Michels were
alike Machiavellians in their insistence on the sharp separation
between rulers and ruled, on the necessary role of force and
fraud in government, and on the inevitable degeneration of all
political groups and institutions. With these pessimistic
doctrines, they coupled in only apparent disharmony--an
equally Machiavellian longing for freedom.25
It is through these theorists primarily that contemporary social science
has derived the notion of political and social elites.

And within the
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co11111oh agreement on the theory of governing minorities, each of these
three thinkers has placed his emphasis on different aspects of the
formulation which have expanded the scope and direction of this
i nte l ·l ectua l inquiry.
Gaetano Mosca, an Italian political scientist whose work bridged
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, first formulated the theory of
a political ruling class in a work entitled Teorica dei governi.

His

primary concern was the study of the operation of governing bodies and
the behavior of political groups within society.

From this study,

which. was . more fully exposed in The Ruling Class, Mosca concluded
that the political process was manipulated by narrow and self-perpet11

uating cliques."

His scope of study was characteristically political

and he did little more than imply that the concept of self-perpetuating
minorhies of rulers could apply to society as a whole.
surfa~e

"Yet below the

of political reasoning, Mosca suggested a wider social appli-

cation.1126

In his discussion of the composition and character of

the ruling class, Mosca found that various sections of the ruling class
expressed or represented social forces which continually varied in
number and importance.

He observes:

As civilization grows, the number of moral and material
influences which are capable of becomirgsocial forces
increases. For example, property in money, as the fruit of
industry and convnerce, comes into being alongside of real
property . . Educ ati on progresses. OccupaHons based on
scientific knowledge gain in importance.
Factors, such as these mentioned by Mosca, can function as social forces
if society is organized in terms of them.

Given this observation, Mosca

asserted that the relations of a ruling class to society need not be
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at all arbitrary.

In fact, to survive, a ruling class must be

flexible enough to meet the challenge of new and powerful social
forces.

This growth of new social forces as well as the decline of

old forces accounts for the constant process of change and dislocation
in the ruling class. 28 This notion forshadows Pareto's conceptualization of the "circulation of elites" which underlies his sociology
and which has emerged as one of the most important fonnulations of
the elite school.
Borrowing from Sorel, Mosca theorized that the ruling class
express its role and position through . a political formula, a myth.
The purpose of such a formula is to legitimize the rule and the structure of society over which a ruling class governs.

Mosca notes:

According to the level of civilization in the peoples
among whom they are current, the various political formulas
may be based either upon supernatural belief or upon
concepts which, if they do not correspond to positive
realities, at least appear to be rational. We shall not
say that they correspond in either case to scientific
truths . . . And .y et that does not mean that political
formulas are mere quackeries aptly invented to trick
the masses into obedience . . . . The truth is that they
answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need,
so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is
governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual
force, but on the basis of a moral principle, has beyond
any doubt a practical and real importance.29
·
In order for political fonnulas to be long-lived, Mosca observed from
history, their essential ingredient must be integrity in order to
withstand changes in the social structure as well as to advance
support from the masses.

''It is perhaps for this reason, half-

consciously understood, that all strong and long-lived societies
have cherished their traditions, even . . . when . . . these traditions
have little relation to the fact. 1130
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Extending his model of a ruling elite to embody all types of
governing entities, Mosca cites two principles-- 11 autocratic and liberal"-which serve as the development laws of ruling classes and which distinguish
types of rule among the various ruling elites: 11 In any form of political organization, authority is either transmitted from above downward
in the political or social scale [the autocratic principl~, or below
upward /the liberal principle/. 1131 Neither of these principles
-

-

contradicts his main assertion that society is divided into a ruling
minority and ruled majority since the principles relate solely to the
selection of leadership within the ruling class.

Though the mode of

entry to the ruling circles changes with the type of principle employed
by a given society, the formation of closed cliques at the top remains
a constant; the manner of formation is the only variable.

Under this

line of reasoning, Mosca further explains his two development laws of
ru 1i ng e 1ites :
In order to reach a high station in an autocracy, it is
sufficient to have the support of one or more persons . . . In
liberal systems one has to steer the inclinations of at least
the whole second stratum of the ruling class, which, if it
does not in itself constitute the electorate, at least supplies
the general staff of leaders who form th~ opinions and determines the conduct of the electing body.3
Distinguishing selection of leadership from recruitment into the
ruling classes, Mosca uses the terms 11 aristocratic 11 and 11 democratic 11
tendencies, referring to the sources from which new membership to the
ruling classes are drawn.

Replenishment of the ruling class with

members from the lower classes defines the democratic tendency whereas
replenishment of the ranks from descendents of the incumbents of power
marks the aristocratic tendency. 33 Mosca discovered that both tendencies
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are always operative within every societ~,34 since the presence of an
elite transcends the guiding traditions or slogans of a particular
society.

Thus the recruitment process becomes an independent factor

utilized by the elite for perpetuation.

Within the larger dictates

of the political myth or formula which is the ultimate behavior
modifier of the elite body, elite groups utilize various methods of
recruitment embodying both tendencies on a flexible basis attuned to
the times and circumstances involved.
These main concerns of Gaetano Mosca's works on elitism--the
concepts of a ruling class, its political application guided by the
principles of a political formula or myth, and the tendencies of elite
recruitment--advanced to a much more theoretical ground than had the
works of Sorel and Spengler, but Mosca's typically political referent
prevented him from generalizing his statement on elites to other spheres
"It was left for Michels to extend
Mosca's theories to the mass organizations 1135 and for Pareto to impleor spectrums within society.

ment the theory of elites as the major factor in his general hypothesis
on the workings of society.
In his study entitled Political Parties, Robert Michels, a
French contemporary of Mosca, attempted to uncover the general laws
or tendencies of organization which he considered an integral aspect
of society as well as a universal feature of human life.

Drawing much

of his data from the experiences of the German Social Democratic Party,
Michels observed that when an organization expanded and its aims had a
certain "scope and importance," its organizational affairs became very
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complex and demanded the execution of innumberable bureaucratic
details to stay functionary.

But by the application of the principle

of division of labor, the demands of organization are met, creating
within the organization a minority of defacto leadership:
Certain individuals specialize in the tasks peculiar to the
organization and its operational life; they devote all or a
considerable portion of their time and intelligence to the
organization; they perfect themselves in the organizational
duties . . . . Except through such a division of labor and
specialization, there is now~~ for the organization to
.
continue in active existence.
Because of this principle inherent in the existence of any large-scale
organization, a class of leadership clearly distinguished from the
masses emerges.

Michels investigates this further in an attempt to

determine who rules

whom~-the

mass or the leadership? Michels

discovered several advantages on the side of leadership through the
course of his investigation.

The customary right to hold office,

Michels notes, has replaced the birth-right in nearly all large scale
organizations. 37 This may superficially signify an equal opportunity
for all, but in practice, the mere fact that an individual has held
the office in the past is thought by him and by the members to give
him a moral claim on it, or on some other leadership post in the
organization.

Significantly, once dues of leadership are paid, the

organization takes care of its own.

Even more fundamental than the

right to office, Michels found, was the psychological dependency felt
by the masses for leadership.

As Machiavelli had noted centuries

earlier, Michels rediscovered the saine tendencies in modern man:
Though it grumbles occasionally, the majority is really
delighted to find persons who will take the trouble to
look after its affairs. In the mass, and even in the
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organized mass of the labor parties, there is an immense
need for· direction and guidance. The need is accompanied
by a genuine cult for the leaders who are regarded as
heroes.38
Other qualities as well secure for the leadership a dominating
stronghold over the vast majority.

These qualities, which could be

considered as specific qualities of leadership, do not necessarily
characterize every leader but represent the leadership generally.
Among them are force of will, a wider extent of knowledge which
impresses the ranks, the force of ideas which rouses th.e masses, a
self-sufficiency which inspires the vast majority, and in very rare
cases a goodness of heart which reignites religious feelings. 39 In
short, the leadership as a whole or as a group are indispensable to
every important organization, and it is this indispensability that
is their strongest lever to perpetuation· and control of the decisionmaking process.

According to Michels, the necessary outcome of this

indi spensabil itY to the masses is that the power of the leadership
is consolidated in an organized sub-group independent of mass action
and control.

Thus the leadership as an organized body has a distinct

and powerful advantage over the ruled majority in every organization. 40
Though the organized leadership maintains the advantage over
the masses in the political power play, leaders are at times ousted.
Michels recognized this possibility and demonstrated that such an
apparent reversal in the power struggle is completely in accordance with
his general theory of the supremacy of leadership.

Such instances usually

occur under two circumstances:
In the first place, if a division occurs among leaders, one
section or both is forced to seek help from the masses of the

21

membership, and is able to organize their strength. The
opposition leadership is sometimes successful in eliminating
the old leadership. Second, new leaders may, and do, arise
as it were spontaneously out of the masses. If the existing
leadership is unable or unwilling to crush or ~ssimilate these
11 outside 11 leaders, then it may be overthrown.4
Seemingly the leadership loses power, but Michels asserts that what in
fact happens is only the substitution of one leadership for another
and that the reality of leadership control over the masses prevails. 42
But this opposition, whatever its stance,. is the strongest and only firm
check on the autocratic tendencies of the leaders.

In this way the

behavior of the leadership is modified relative to the strength of
organized opposition.
No organization can dare dispense with

leadershi~because

would result making certain the demise of the organization.

anarchy

Consequently

leadership remains along with the autocratic tendencies that help
perpetuate the ruling elite. 11 The autocratic tendencies are neither
arbitrary nor accidental nor temporary, but inherent in the nature of
organization . ..4 3 This 11 iron law of oligarchy, 11 which Michels theorized
1

would hold true for all social movements and all forms of society is the
end result of his study.

What he tenned the "iron law of oligarchy" was

the codification of the conviction that political organizations "through
the internal necessities of discipline and administrative continuity
inevitably became closed and self-perpetuating oligarchies. 1144 This being
'

'

the case it is left for the masses through active and organized
opposition to modify the behavior of these inevitable oligarchy of organizations.
power.

But modification, and not control, typifies the extent of mass
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This model, constructed by Robert Michels as an extension of
the

ground~mrk

previously fonnulated by Gaetano Mosca in his analysis

of the political elite, serves to point out that organization, when
once it became an influential factor in the running of "influential"
affairs, presupposes the existence of a leadership which not only
controls the non-leadership elements oftheorganization, but itself
becomes a closed self-perpetuating organ of rule.

Michels' work advanced

elitist thought beyond the political arena (though it could be argued
that all large organizations are political in character) to that of
society as a whole.
Another Machiavellian, Vilfredo Pareto, a French Italian national
who spent.his productive academic life in Geneva, relegated the study
of elites to a singular element in a sociology based on the study of
non-logical action.

In the last analysis, however, Pareto made a lasting

contribution to the extension of elite · theory which persisted in an
underlying fashion

througho~t

the intricacies of his weighty discourse

and which emerged bascially unscathed from the methodological problems
which befell his general tract on society. 45
Alone among his elite theorist predecessors, Vilfredo Pareto "went
beyond the facts of political manipulation which they all agreed, to
attempt a definition of those basic human impulses that offered the
raw material for mass leadership. 1146

In his treatise, Mind and Society,

Pareto distinguishes between logical and non-logical conduct which is
the key to his general schema on the workings of society:
A man's conduct (that is, human action) is "logical" under
the following circumstances: when his action is motivated by
a deliberately held goal or purpose; when that goal is possible;
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when the steps or means he takes to reach the goal are in . fact
appropriate for reaching it .. . . . If however, any one or more
of the conditions for logical conduct are not present, then

the actions are non-logical.47
Drawing from Sorel's preliminary work on non-logical conduct, 48
Pareto undertook an exhaustive study of human conduct throughout the
course of history to determine to what extent non-logical conduct had
a bearing on the 11 social equilibrium. 1149 His evidence supported his
contention that what happens to society is only remotely influenced
by the rational goals of men, and that the delicate balance of the
social equilibirum is primarily effected by non-logical action.

The

evidence is too vast to review in these pages, but there are certain
types of human activities that significantly relate to social and political circumstances which Pareto examines that warrant some critical
examination.
Social development correlates directly to such factors as climate
and geography as well as to biological and physical characteristics in
general.

Such influences cannot be considered as logically motivated.

Here the influence to social development is remote, but in other areas
where the influence is not as remote, the motivation still stands as
non-logical by Pareto's definition.

For example, social goals, purposes,

schemas, etc. of modern man are usually verbalized in documents,
programs, laws, slogans, and declarations.

In most cases the vagueness

and ambiguity of the language presupposes the non-logical motivation
involved.

As one scholar of elitism explains:

The point is not that these slogans, ideals, or programs,
and declarations do not influence action. Under certain
circumstances they undoubtedly do, and tremendously. But
they are not and cannot be part of logical or rational
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action. I am not taking logical steps in pursuit of
a goal if the presumed goal is nothing definite.50
Even if the goal were definite, the subsequent activity usually
nullifies the effects of the objectivity of that goal. 51 · Such was
the legacy Pareto derived from history, and with it he formulated his
"celebrated theory of 'residues' and 'derivations.
From

~is

111

discussion qf non-logical conduct in which he asserted

the primacy of non-logical motivation in relations to social and
politi.cal change, Pareto proceeds to focus directly on the types of
non-logical conduct which comprise such action.

He characterizes the

two types of non-logical action as "residues" and "derivations"
which one conmentator describes:
In this schema, the residues represented what was unvarying,
or at least what changed only very slowly in human conduct,
the derivations the constantly var5~ng explanations and
rationalizations of such behavior.
.
Of the six residual categories Pareto named, all tended to fall into two
main categories or groupings:

11

(1) 'combinations,' the tendencies to

change, newness, manipulations, speculations, upsets, progress; and
(2) 'group persistences,' the tendencies to inertia, resistance to
social change, social solidarity, conversion, confonnity. 1153 Along
with these constants in history are the variable factors, the manifestations of residues which Pareto defines as derivations.

They include the

categories of "assertion, authority, accords with sentiment or principles
and verba 1 proofs. 1154 Pareto gives 1ittl e credit for the ro 1e of the
derivations in determining social change, and concludes that an alteration
in the residues in the last analysis changes the status quo.

This is but

a more generalized fonn of the theory of the political formula as espoused
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by Mosca and Sorel.

In Pareto•s language, a derivation is only a

rationalization of a status quo, not a primary element in the detennination of social development or change.

Though derivations cannot be

disregarded as unimportant, their importance lies in their relationship
to the residues they represent, not in themselves.
Though Pareto 1s extensive work suffered from his strict adherence
to the positivist creed, 55 his sociology nevertheless contributed largely
to elitist thought when, in the final pages of his massive treatise,
Mind and Society, he applied his theories of 11 residues and derivations"
to the course of elites in history, the theory of which was in basic
agreement with his nee-Machiavellian counterparts.
The assessment of how much of each residue characterized
the successive elites in history--and how the contradictory
attitude manifested itself either through the progressive
infusion of new elements into an old ruling class or through
violent overthrow of one elite by another--this estimate of
the "social equilibrium11 called forth Pareto's most pungent
and te 11 i ng commentary. 56
Giving his general theories a practical application, so to speak,
Pareto fonnulated a theory of social change tied to "elite circulation."
Like the other nee-Machiavellians, Pareto held that the character of
society is the character of its elite and that in the last analysis
the accomplishments of this elite are the accomplishments of society.
Thus the social equilibrium is determined by changes static or dynamic
within the elite echelons of society. 57 In tenns of Pareto's concentration on the relationship of residues to the determination of the
social equilibrium, his concept of elite circulation can be explained
as an interplay between the residue of "combination" and the residue
of 1group persistence" among elite personnel.

If fundamental changes
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redefine the social equilibrium, then it is only because the character
of the composition of the elites has altered with either a gradual
infusion of new personnel reflecting residual opposition or the complete
overthrowi~g

of the old-guard altogether.

In either case, social

change has taken place, not because of a new rationalization or derivation,
but because of the altered residual supremacy among the elite.

In

this conceptualization of elite circulation, the "lion and fox" metaphor
of Machiavelli's writings becomes a sophisticated and exemplary theory
of social change which, though clarified by its political context, has
essentially umlimited application within all sectors of power
concentration in society . •. Going beyond the political scope of Mosca
and

delvin~

deeper into human conduct than either Sorel or Michels,

Pareto's scholarship contributed a necessary link in the formation of
modern social thought. 58
From Machiavelli's "ruler-type" to Sorel's "heroes," Mosca's
"ruling class, Michel's "l.eadership oligarchy," and Pareto's elites
11

11

11

has emerged a school of thought pursuing the source and perpetuation
of power strongholds in society and their relation with the non-powerful
members of society--the masses.

As seen, the central assumption under-

lying this intellectual discourse is that in any society there is a
distinction between those who rule and those who do not.

It encompasses

all aspects of society, not just in the political sphere which makes for
ready analysis and investigation.

The theory of elites makes no pretense

to being a theory of all historical change, but rather a means or method
to enhance historical understanding regarding social, economic, and
political change.

It has, by narrowing the historical perspective

under inquiry, facilitated the understanding of social change in the
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complex interdependent fashion that it entails in the analysis of
any society.

As two theorists conclude:

Elite theory pinpoints the central . . . actors. It does not
tell us how much power they have with respect to any given
social policy, and it does not tell us what social goals
they will pursue . . . . Like any social theory there are
limits to what the elite perspective can accomplish, and
these limits may we 11 preclude its usefu ll nes s in analyzing
many social processes. Indeed, one should be wary of any
theory which seeks to explain too much. What elite theory
does explg~n entitles tt to the highest standing in social
sciences.
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CHAPTER III
ELITE THEORY AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
Elitist theory dictates that the presence of an elite group of
rulers is neither bound nor limited, to any singular type of political
structure as elites rule in every society.

Although this concept is

inherent to elitist theory, the seeming nature and structure of many
political entities belies the very existence of elites.

Democracies

. po1n
. t .l
presen t a case 1n

Democracy as an expression or definition implies the ultimate in
politicalfreedom2 as the term democracy is usually synonymous with
"self-government" or "government by the people.

11

In such a society

the establishment of an elite ruling class would be an anathema to
the system as well as a contradiction to the tenets of democracy which
incl~de

popular participation in the decisions that direct the lives

of individuals in society, government by majority rule where minorities
share the freedoms of press, assembly, and petition, and a commitment
to the preservation of the values of life, liberty, and property as
well as equal opportunity for all citizens. 3 This conclusion is,
however, clearly premature when placed within the confines of the
elitist perspective:
The theory of democracy as self-government must . . . be
understood as a myth, formula, or derivation. It does
not correspond to any actual or possible social reality .
. . It does not, however follow that the theory of democracy
is without any influence on the social structure . . . . The
ruling minority always seeks to justify and legitimize its
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rule in part through a formula, without which the social
structure would disintegrate. The positive significance
of democratic theory is as a political formula of this kind.4
Democracy does not technically mean "self-government 11 or "government by
the people," but it does constitute a unique mechanism of rule whereby
the peculiar institutions of suffrage and political liberties modify
the political character of the state as well as the behavior of its
elites.
Given this perspective of rule, democracy and elitism do not
represent two mutually exclusive states of affairs, but rather interdependent factors in which elitism corresponds to the general category
shaped by the specific conditions implied by the meaning of democracy.
Granting the validity of this assumption, the pejorative aura surrounding the term elitism as contrasted with the positive implications
of the term democracy provides for another unwarranted problem in this
analysis.

Elitism connotes subjection, democracy freedom.

However

"the scholar· cannot be ... choosy. · He uses words for their descriptive
rather than emotional content. 115 Significantly, though the word elite
may evoke negative emotions, it is actually a neutral descriptive
term illustrating political realities in society.

Democracy offers

a political rationale acceptable to certain societies in which both
the elites and masses share the stakes involved for the continuation
of the social system.

But ultimately in any system, the responsibility

for stability lies in the hands of the rulers--the elites who, "with
few exceptions, have a special stake in the continuation . of the system
in which their privilege rests. 116

Imposing the conditions of democracy

on the elitist model captures the essence of "the irony of democracy:"
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Democracy is government "by the people, but responsibility
for the survival of democracy rests on the shoulders
of the elites. This is the irony of democracy: Elites mu~t
govern wisely if government 11 by the people" is to survive.
11

Whether it be ironic or not, the traditions of democracy are nurtured by
those elites whose existence depends upon the continuation of democratic
principles in the system. ·
In the United States, the principles of democracy have been
espoused, propagandized, and seemingly adhered to since the times of
the "founding fathers 11 --the creators of the Constitution.

Whether or

not the United States is in effect a democracy is not a question to be
examined here.

But for an examination of the general structure of elitism

in America, it is of central importance to discuss how the United States'
unique political structure has shaped the nature of its elite recruitment, circulation, and accountability--those factors which determine
elite viability and perpetuation.
The amount of power in the hands of any elite group is a matter
for investigation, not definition.

Therefore, in studying elites in

the United States, no attempt is made to label these groups as allpowerful or completely cohesive.

For example, the political elite

of the United States includes leaders of the political party temporarily
out of power as well as persons aspiring to top positions in the
political economy who do not necessarily share the views of all the
incumbents in power.

What is assumed is the presence of elites within

the social system and the implications that lie therein:
Elitism asserts that society is divided into the few who
have power and the many who do not. According to elite theory,
elites--not masses--allocate values for society. Elites
are not typical of the masses in backgrounds or attitudes.
Elites share a consensus on behalf of the basic values
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of the system, and public policy reflects prevailing values
of elites rather than demands of the masses. Elitism
also asserts that changes in publi"c policy are incremental
rather than revolutionary, and that movement of non-elites
into elite positions is slow and limited only to non-elites
who have accepted elite values. Finally elitism asserts
that elites influence masses more than masses influence
elites.8
Within the framework of this perspective, certain descriptive patterns
of American political elites emerge.
;he political history of the United States has been consistent
with elitist theory. 9 The ruling American elite has assimilated
diverse groups such as Federalists, Jeffersonians, Industrialists,
Liberals, and Minorities (such as Blacks and women) without any
significant break in the continuity of the core values and traditions
in the American political and economic system as established by the
Constitution
of 1787 which in itself is a reflection of its framers-•
a group of wealthy, talented, and educated men representative of
powerful political and economic interests.

The opposition to the rat-

ification of the Constitution, more significantly typified by the AntiFederal i.sts, who were of the same wealthy background as the Federalist
contingent, in the last analysis supported the execution of the Constitution
when ratified.

Although this demonstrates dissensus within the

economic and political elite during the early years of the nation,
it also points out that the Anti-Federalists rallied behind the
federal government when the circumstances demanded it.

Certainly

this continuity of elite consensus does not characterize the whole of
American history, the Civil War andthe political and economic breakdown following the Great Depression of the 1930's being two blatant
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examples of elite conflict during critical periods of American
history.

Closer examination of these periods reveals that the

turning point for renewed elite consensus occured as the reorganized
elite "took [The situatio!!J into account and either repress[e1f,
assuage/dl through symbolic benefits, or assuage/dl through
substantive benefits intended to appease the aggrieved group. 1110
The Emancipation Proclamation, a largely military and political
manuever on Lincoln's part to preserve the nation, and the establishment of the welfare state by Franklin Roosevelt fit directly into
this elitist perspective .

Political conflict in American history

has involved a very narrow range of issues because of the solidarity
of its elites and the loose principles of the Constitution which both
bind an,d guide them.
One of the greatest contributions of the democratic revolution
was to shift the patterns and cycles of the elite recruitment from the
qualifying factors of birth and bloodline to those of talent, achievement, and accomplishment. 11 This is not to suggest that the elite
recruitment process in the United States has been open to all (Blacks
and women, for example, were excluded), but the process has involved
a much more complex model than that of simple biological reproduction
and heredity.
Opportunity for entry into the elite circles in the United States
has not been arbitrarily determined by any one factor, but the chances
for elite recruitment when distributed over the entire population have
not fallen equally.

Factors of family background, social status,

religious affliation, education, sex, race, and political connections
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have and continue to contribute favorably to the advantage of some as
well as to the disadvantage of others. 12 Though these factors can
facilitate vertical movement into elite channels, they can never
guarantee it as the motivations of ambition or success as well as the
very real possibility of a changing political climate could well
alter the patterns of recruitment.
In a capitalist nation such as the United States, wealth has
determined social status, and those possessing a disproportionate
share of the nation's capital have assumed that same disproportionate
share of power.

That a class bias based primarily on wealth remains

a decisive, if not a fixed, factor in the recruitment to the top positions of the political economy is evidence by the assertion of elite
theorists that the wealthiest one-fifth of all American families have
held about nine out of every ten elite positions on the federal level
in the political economy with the next wealthiest controlling the
remainder, save for a few token positions scattered among the rest. 13
The reinforcement of this social phenomenon whereby wealth provides
the necessary criteria for elevation in the hierarchy of power is
reflected in the old bourgeois dictum "that power and status should be
congruent in society. 1114 Several infrastructures within the social
system continue to reinforce this power/status ratio.

Self-esteem

characterizes the nature of wealthy, influential families.

Patricians

act as if they should be issuing orders, asserting themselves to
legitimize their status in .society.

Patterns of self-assertion and

self-esteem do not necessarily correspond perfectly with social status,
but the relationship has tested positive and rather strong. 15 This

37

legitimization of political authority for the socially prestigious
has been further cemented by the electorate which weighs the candidates
past achievements as an indicator of future success . Wealth has had
the tendency to demonstrate achievement whether it be acquired or
inherited:
If the wealthy and presitgious of society have a platform
on which to display their achievements, they have additional
advantage as well. They are successful in those activities
that correspond closely to what is most esteemed in society.
The head of a giant corporation or the talented lawyer,
much more than the successful entertainer, intellectual
or athlete, claims that that in which he e~cels is critical
to the well-being of the whole of society.16
.
Though it is questionable to some whether the majority of elected
politicians could be considered elite personnel, 17 these positions have
trained and groomed selected individuals for further advancement.

More

important than the electorate in the recruitment process have been
the elites themselves who have hand-picked replacements.

They have

tended to select men of similar mind set, background, and status as
\

precautionary measures to ensure the perpetuation of similar rule.
That the wealthy classes have functioned as a pool for elite recruitment has been a constant phenomenon throughout American history.
Wealth and family connections have facilitated elite recruitment,
but in order to arrive at the top, political beliefs must fall
within the parameters of acceptable political and economic orientation.
These parameters eliminate the possibility of radical viewpoints
from the far 1eft and far right, but the end res u1t is far from tot a1
consensus.

Within the elite, wide-ranging view points have been kept

alive by "party" politics which is as much an integral part of the
business and military elites as the elites of the political sphere.
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Codes of conduct, and the adherence to the American traditions of
private enterprise and a self-restraining government have held the
elites in check in the making of essentially conservative political/
economic decisions in a protectionist light.
The process and nature of elite circulation characterizes the
manner in which the transferral of power maintains stability within
an elitist system.

The circulation of elites is defined by the

process whereby the ability to govern and the powers of government
lie in the same hands as well as that process which allows for the
expression of social interests within the elite circles. 18 If the
upward or downward channels of mobility are blocked, the process
deteriorates and social stability is jeopardized.
can take place in either of two ways:

Elite circulation

slowly through assimilation and

recruitment or suddenly through rebellion or revolution.

The American

experience has been one of the latter in which groups fostering broad
social interests have organized and upon maturity and acceptance within
the system shared the power with the previously established interests.
This process involves much more than just personnel turnover resulting
from "death, retirements, or legal restrictions. 1119 Significantly, it
is replacement within the elite of personnel reflecting the new
ideologies of social or economic transformations of the society or
the rise of talented individuals from the lower classes.

This typ-

ification of elite circulation in 1he United States has been central to
the high degree of stability which has characterized the system.
In an attempt to understand the reasons or causes for the change
of composition in elite circles within the historical framework of the

39

United States, theorists have pointed to the interplay of American
I

democratic institutions with the transformations of the social and
economic forces of the nation. 20 Economic and social forces have under~
mined the viability of established elites and strengthened the credibility
of counter-elite forces, and elections have contributed to the facilitation
of entry of these non-elites to ruling positions. But the role of the
electorate has been of secondary importance 21 in this process since the
rising power of non-elite groups has directly related to the economic and
political technological conditions which determine its success or failure.
Thus the electorate is limited in its choice due the high attrition rate
of the aspiring non-elites to power positions.

Before a counter-elite force

presents itself as a viable alternative to the electorate, it has usually
modified its stance (as the elite has its position) as to fall within the
parameters of elite acceptance.
Within the constructs of a procedural democracy which operates via
the political vehicles of elections, rights of political association, and
the freedoms of speech and press, elites, are at least nominally held in
check as to the extent of their rule.

Although in the purist interpretation

of elite theory it is stated that elites rule in every society, nevertheless
elites rule and behave in a more moderate, if not different manner in
11

democratic 11 societies where the dictates of rule are widely acknowledged

and accepted.

As one theorists notes:

To see elites as the central actors in history is not to see
them as unconstrained and operating without limits. Elites
are seldom all-powerful and completely autonomous of restrictive social process. Elites are limited in the first place
by the policy priorities and political procedures already .
established in the society, especially where these priorities
and procedures are widely accepted.22
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While any political action undertaken by an elite might be considered
possible, it is highly improbably that blatant violations of democratic
traditions would occur in an open society claiming democratic techniques of rule.* To perform the functions of rule in the United
States otherwise would or could cause i1T1T1ediate breakdown within the
elite consensus and jeopardize the stability of the system which has
nurtured the continuance of elites.

Therefore completely authoritarian

measures, and the stifling of social and economic transformations have
been avoided by the elites to ensure their own perpetuation and that of
the system as well.

These constraints on the elite are also evidenced

by the procedures of democracy which have. facilitated the circulation
of elites.

The political levers of elections and freedoms of access

to press and speech, while not cruci a1 to the emergence of counterel i tes (which hasten the circulation process), have served as
indicators of mass preference and toleration.

Elites may bear no

recognized accountability to the masses, but in order to survive
as an elite ruling group, accountability to the system has been
essential.
The history of American elites is not limited to the history
of political elites as the political arena is but one stronghold of
power in the United States. Elites have operated within other areas
as well. 23 With the advent of the industrial revolution, corporate

*For instance, the calling off of elections, the dismissal
of Congress, or complete censorship of the press would be flagrant
displays of unconstitutionality and therefore intolerable.
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policy has increasingly shaped the direction of the American economy
which has had broad implication for governmental policy.

In order

for the political economy to run smoothly without major breakdowns,
the relationship between these two paramount sectors of American
society must both be characterized by consensus and stability.

The

Great Depression of the 1930's precipitated a breakdown in both the
viability and effectiveness of these two elite groups to rule.

What

emerged from the chaos were the foundations for a positive or welfare
state which has produced great changes within the American system
without substantially altering or destroying its basic infrastructures.
Analyzing these events within the framework of the elitist perspective
should provide some novel interpretations in the history of America's
recent past.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EMERGING COUNTER-ELITE
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
During the first hundred years in the history of the United States,
lawyers traditionally comprised the ruling elite in the management of
government affairs. 1 By the beginning of the twentieth century, this
ruling minority, trained in the fields of jurisprudence, no longer held
the necessary credentials for administering the fast growing industrial
state, because the complicated and "collosal dimensions" of the new
societal organization and industrial expansion demanded the expertise of
professionals specializing in the study of society.

The Progressive

movement, based on the ideals of government and societal reform, hastened
the recruitment of professionals from the various disciplines of the
social sciences, and gave these men a role in the shaping of a new and
changing society. 2 During this period, at the turn of the last century,
"the attention of both scientists and reformers was inevitably drawn to
the changing character of American society, to treeffects of industrialization, irrmigration, urbanization, corporate concentration and
political corruption. 113

In these endeavors, the climate of the Progressive

movement joined the talents of the reformers and the social scientists
which created a reform movement based on the evidence of social intelligence derived from the data of investigation and research provided by
the social scientists.

And with the widescale acceptance of the Progressive
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platform, social scientists in growing numbers

e~tered

into government

service and demonstrated that the "intellect could be politically
effective. 114
The trial ground for the role of intellectuals in public service
was not Washington, but the state capitals which first offered the
example of recruiting experts on a wide scale for government service.
Madison, Wisconsin was such a place.

During the Progressive period,

the much acclaimed "Wisconsin idea" significantly altered the political
experience of the state. 5 The "Wisconsin idea, 11 based on the promotion
of the study of law, politics, economics, and history in the university
in order to train experts equipped with the necessary skills to manage
government affairs, redefined the role of the university to the society.
The promoters of the "Wisconsin idea," especially Professors Richard T.
Ely, Frederick Jackson Turner and Thomas C. Chamberlain, envisioned the
university as a non-partisan entity, serving the people as a whole by
offering information, statistics, advice and skill to the political
process.

Robert Lafollette·, during his governorship of Wisconsin in

the early 1900's, shared this view of the role of the university.

He

called upon the university for experts to advise his political machine
in the areas of tax reform, rai 1road control, and direct primary 1egis-

1ation.

His sympathy for the "Wisconsin idea" fostered political recruit-

ment from the university of experts proficient in the social sciences,
and significantly facilitated the growth of independent services
established by experts outside the government to supplement the political
mechanism.

The Legislative Reference Service, established by Charles

McCarthy, a University of Wisconsin graduate student, was this type of
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service organization which sorted out vast a11Dunts of information,
and investigated complex problems pertinent to the legislature.

By

these efforts, Wisconsin demonstrated to · the nation the viability of an
integrated political arena of experts and politjcians.
Progressive platform gained national

acc~ptance

By the time the

under the presidencies

of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the need for the placement
of experts in government was at least publicly acknowledged, if not
wholly practiced. 6
The presidencies of both Roosevelt and Wilson "encouraged the
belief that ideas had a vital part in government; but at the same time
neither was entirely in sympathy with his intellectual contemporaries,
and neither enjoyed their full confidence. 117 Roosevelt recruited experts
for advice on railroad control, irrmigration, and meat inspection as well
as attracting such intellectuals as Felix Frankfurter, James Garfield,
and Gifford Pinchot into government service. 8 While he mobilized men
of talent into the political arena, Roosevelt was also quick to denounce
11

heterdox 11 ideas of the intellectuals as in the case of the muckrackers

whom he viewed as stirring up 11 revolutionary ideas. 119 Although many
intellectuals and experts won the admiration of Roosevelt, they were
neither recruited nor utilized to any great extent in his administration.
Woodrow Wilson, himself a political scientist, had little regard
for experts.

During his presidential campaign of 1912, he stated:

What I fear is a government of experts. God forbid that in
a democratic country we should resign the task and give the
government over to the experts. What are we for if we are to
be scientifically taken care of by a small number of gentlemen
who are the only men who understand the job?lO
This reflected the Wilsonian belief that big business, vested interests,
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and experts comprised a solid combine that could only be broken by
returning government to the constituency. 11 However, the experience
of his presidency which eventually involved the execution of a wartime
foreign policy altered Wilson's perception of the intellectual and the
expert.

In order to win the war and influence the peace, Wilson needed

the aid of the intellectual conmunity.

Therefore, during the course

of World War I, he recruited academics into government service:
Historians and writers were mobilized for propaganda and
experts of all kinds were recruited as advisers. Military
Intelligence, Chemical Warfare, the War Industries Board
swarmed with academics, and the Washington's Cosmos Club
was reported to be "little better than a faculty meeting
of all the universities. 12
11

This recruitment underlines the need for expertise on the national
level to successfully wage a modern war.

The social scientists and

experts, mobilized in Washington, effectively performed the tasks
inherent in the execution of a war.

By the establishment of the War

Industries Board, under the chainnanship of Bernard Baruch, the economic
mobilization of the country's resources was both quick and efficient with
minimal waste of manpower or resources. 13 With the added wartime
responsibilities of the federal government, more extensive sources
of information and statistical services were needed for the centralized
control of the war effort.

The war both magnified the inadequacy of

the existing services and supported the development of more accurate
services in the compilation and interpretation of raw data. 14 The work
of the psychologists, for example, previously tested in the areas of
human behavior such as sensation, reaction, learning, memory, and
attention was utilized by the military during the war especially in the
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organization of a program of controlled testing of the troops, and in
the formulation of the Alpha and Beta controls in intelligence testing.

15

The Wilson administration also recognized that success at the Peace
Conference would require expert knowledge in the fields of geography,
economics, ethnology, history, international law, and strategy since
these fields would comprise the primary focus of the peace talks.

Late

in 1917, Co 1one1 House began recruiting experts in these fie 1ds from

the universities. From this recruitment, he formed a group known as
"the Inquiry 1116 which operated independently of the regular diplomatic
channels of the State Department, since the department staff lacked the
necessary personnel.

The staff of "the Inquiry", which included some

150 experts, accompanied Wilson to Paris where it played a significant
role in the negotiations.

These illustrations point out the widespread

integration of academics and intellectuals in the wartime federal
bureaucracy, but the association between the experts and the old guard
politicians ended as the nation retreated into isolation at the war's end. 17
From the initial years of the twentieth century through the close
of World War I, the utilization of experts and intellectuals by the government altered constantly between limited recruitment and dismissal.

The

experiences of the social scientists and experts in the government during
this period, however limited, did provide the stimulus for the necessary
advancements required by the disciplines before the application of
these fields of social intelligence would be a
governmental policy.

via~le

instrument of

Although the political experience underlined the

shortcomings of the professions to cope with the dilenmas of modern
society, the retreat from political life in the Twenties gave the
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intellectuals the time to advance the methodology of their various
professions.
The mood of the Twenties inthe academic corrmunity involved in
social science research was optimistic:
Sociologists of the period, full of the elan of their new
subject, exultant over the apparent defeat of religious
obscurantism, were as optimistic as the businessman and
the historian, though for different reasons. Their New
Era lay in the future rather than the present; its
motivating force was not technology alone, but the
guiding social intelligence.18
·
Because of the advances made in the social sciences in the previous
two decades, these professions abandoned the "sentiment, impressionism,
and introspection" that had dominated to a large degree their research
and sought to derive and establish new methods for the quantification
and interpretation of information which they increasingly felt would
act as a "guide for practical statesmanship." As one student of the
Twenties explained, social scientists were confident that they, as a
new elite, would be able to lead mankind "out of the fog of dissolving
tradition and toward the end of controversy and the reign of universal
efficiency. 1119
The Twenties precipitated the rise of new institutes devoted to
social science research that were privately supported and independent
of the government but which were available to the government for
consultation and advice on policy matters. 20 Realistically, they owed
their beginnings to the government's demand for this type of knowledge
and information during World War I anq to the availability of funds from
the private sector, namely from foundations such as the Carnegie Corporatiqn
and the Rockefeller Foundation.

During this period, "research. ; .was
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established as a legitimate government function and, within limits
was sustainedand supported, especially by Hoover, who was a dominant
figure in government in that decade. 1121 Having a deep respect for the
gathering of information by specialists and experts, Herbert Hoover,
in his role as Secretary of Co1T111erce, and later as President, sought to
coordinate scientific and social science research with philanthropic
support in the private sector in order:
to develop broad channels for cooperative action among
influential segments of the society, to support these
efforts with scientific and economic advice, and, in the
process, to ~void the necessity for action by the central
government. 2
His efforts proved emminently successful.

Privately-funded institutes

reached new levels of sophistication in information gathering, and
explored widely in the fields of public administration, governme;nt
policy formulation, and economic research.

Ironically, Hoover, as

President, would resist much of the advice social scientists offered
as remedies for the socio-economic chaos created by the world-wide
depression which began in 1929.

Nevertheless, with the encouragement

of men like Hoover, and with the establishment of the institutes of
research, the potential of social science as an instrument of government
policy came close to realization by the end of the decade.
The National Bureau of Economic Research was in its conceptual and
tentative planning stages before the outbreak of World War I in 1917. 23
Malcolm C. Rorty of American Telephone and Telegraph Company, and N. I.
Stone, a former statistician, became acquainted in conjunction with
unemployment and legislative alternatives in New York.

After several

disputes over economic policy, they decided jointly to set up an organization
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devoted to research on controversial economic subjects of national
interest.

Rorty and Stone contacted three major economists with differ-

ent view points: Wesley Mitchell of

Colu~bia;

Edwin F. Gay of the Harvard

Business School; and John R. Co111T10ns of the University of Wisconsin,
and formerly of the LaFollette's brain trust.

With their enthusiastic

support, Rorty and Stone started preliminary planning and began seeking
financial backing.

The outbreak of the war delayed further planning,

but as soon as the war ended, Rorty secured the necessary financial
support, and by 1920 the National Bureau of Economic Research was
launched with Mitchell as Director of Research. 24
Under the auspicies of Mitchell, long-tenn research, based on
national income and its distribution, and business cycles, occupied
the attention of the Bureau. 25 During the course of the Twenties, experts
such as Simon Kuznets developed theories of a complex nature involving
national income estimates.

While such preoccupations conmanded most

of its attention in its first decade of operation, the Bureau undertook
short-term analyses and projects as well.

At the government's request,

studies were conducted on unemployment in conjunction with the Conference
on Unemployment in 1921.

In response to Hoover's interest on the effects

of unemployment on economic change, the Bureau did several reports for
the federal government.

Such short-term analyses, however, were considered

by researchers such as Mitchell as having little significance in the
creation of fundamental knowledge, si.nce changing conditions more often
than not refuted research findings and invalidated their conclusions.
Of this experience, he notes:
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Our experience with ad hoc investigations confirms the
opinion that they contribute less in the long run to the
knowledge men need, and less to the practical treatment
of social ills, than systematic studies of broader
and more fundamental character.26
Despite the obvious shortcomings of the short-term assignment type of
research undertaken at times by the Bureau, the expertise gained in
fundamental and long-term research provided invaluable experience for
the economists involved.
The Institute for Government Research was established along many
of the same lines as the National Bureau of Economic Research, and for
similar purposes. 27 Derived from the notion that there should be a
11

non-partisan, independent institution to consider the problems of public
administration, and particularly those of the National Government, 1128
the Institute received its original conceptualization for organization
from the Car.mission on Economy and Efficiency appointed by President Taft
in 1910.

The Co111T1ission s emphasis was on the managerial role of the
1

President, and the use of the budget as a lever in executive management.
The Institute, an outgrowth of this Co111T1ission, was created by the principal
staffers* of the Co111T1ission and received financial backing from the
Rockefeller Foundation.

Frank J. Goodnow, the President of John Hopkins

University, chaired the board of the Institute's Directors and William F.
Willoughby, a leader in the field of budgetary reform, directed the staff.
Adhering to Goodnow's contention that policy and administration must
be separate, the Institute defined its function as study and research
*Members of the staff of the Convnission on Economy and Efficiency
later associated with the Institute for Government Research included:
W. F. Willoughby, Frank J. Goodnow, Henry S. Chase, and Merritt 0. Chance.
Rexford Tugwell, The Enlargement of the Presidency (New York, 1960) p. 398.
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upon which reforms, at the instigation of the President or Congress,
would be based.

Besides working on budgetary reform, the Institute,

during the Twenties, concentrated on analyzing, office by office,
the Executive Branch of the federal government.

A series of monographs,
summarizing the study's findings, provided a basis for later reforms. 29

Constantly running into financial difficulties, the Institute frequently
relied on the fund-raising of Robert S. Brookings, a financier from
St. Louis, and in 1928 the Institute for Government Research was incorporated into the newly established Brookings Institution.
Robert S. Brookings laid the early. foundations for the Brookings
Institution while organizing the Institute for Economics with funds from
the Carnegie Corporation. 30 Unlike the National Bureau of Economic
Research whose primary focus was on economic methodology, the Institute ·
for Economics dedicated itself to analysis and problem-solving.

Under

the guidance of its director, Harould Moulton, the Institute addressed
itself to the "questions of international economic reconstruction and
the effects of international policies on commerce, agriculture, industry,
and labor. 1131 In 1924, Robert Brookings also acquired funding for the
Graduate School of Economics and Government in Washington, D. C. which
was loosely associated with both the Institute of Economics and the
Institute for Government Research.

By 1928, funding for the three

di.stinct organizations became impossible, so they merged into what
became known as the Brookings Institution.

Several changes followed:

the Graduate School was abolished and replaced by a training division,
while the two Institutes retained their separate identities as
distinct divisions of the larger enterprise.

The Brookins Institution,
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based in Washington, D. C., continued to operate for the development
of the

soci~l

sciences with particular emphasis on the1r application

to the national government.
The National Bureau of Economic Research as well as the Brookings
Institution underlined the trend towa.rd specialization and isolation
among the various disciplines of the social sciences in their post-war
development.

This trend led to the founding of the Social Science

Research Council (SSRC) whose purpose was to instigate interaction
among the various disciplines of the social sciences. 32 The focus of the
SSRC was not research but rather on the mett:lods of improving research
conditions in the universities, and on strengthening the general under- standing of the nature and structure of the social sciences.

As

political scientist Gene Lyons explains:
Because it was a council of all the social sciences, its
intellectual base was broader than that of either the Bureau
or Brookings . . . . Less exclusively concerned with economic
analysis than the National Bureau, the SSRC was more inclined
to view economic problems in tenns of a socio-economic mix; and,
in the study of government, it was less wedded to the goals of
efficiency and economy than the Institute for Government
Research, and more disposed to examine the social and
psychological determinants of politics and administration. 33
Charles

E.

Merriam, 34 a professor of political science at ,the

University of Chicago, was the driving force in making the SSRC a
reality.

Merriam went beyond the historical, legalistic approach of

his discipline that had preoccupied the professionals of political
science to a study of "systematic politics." This involvement with the
relations,hip ·of scientific knowledge to political power consumed most
of Merriam's productive academic life and convinced him of the need
for interdisciplinary scholarship.

Throughout his career, Merriam
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intermittently served in the .tangible world of politics and government,
chairing such groups as the City Council of Chicago, President Hoover's
Research Corrmittee on Recent Social Trends, and eventually Franklin
Roosevelt's National Planning Board.

In the early Twenties, however,

Merriam's chief concern was the SSRC, its acceptance among the various
social science associations, and its financial support.

Having received

enthusiastic academic support, Merriam secured financial backing from
the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial.* In December of 1923,
Merriam formally incorporated the SSRC as a cross-disciplinary research
institute of all social sciences.
From the start, the staffers of the SSRC, under Merriam's direction,
attempted to work out the details involved. in the SSRC's two main
objectives:

the promotion of the development of social science as

a whole and the improvement of the training of social scientists.

To

facilitate the latter objective, a program of fellowships and research
grants was established to "increase the number of social scientists, to
improve their preparation, and to support their investigations through
financial assistance for travel, facilities, and equipment. 1135 The
implementation of the overall promotion of social science proved much
more difficult.

The field was divided into many varied disciplines, all

at different stages of development, and with their own traditional
and methodological backgrounds.

The SSRC proceeded slowly to attack

*From 1922 to 1929, Beardsley Ruml, a colleague of Merriam's from
Chicago, served as the director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller
Fund, and as a result more than $40 million was distributed to the SSRC,
the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Brookings Institution
during this period. Gene M. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership (New York,
1969), p. 44

56

the. problem and within three years produced a methodological study
based on a "case book" approach which described the methods available
to the various disciplines but which issued no judgmental opinions. 36
This cautious but sensible policy averted intense
otherwise have developed.

~ostilities

that might

In the long run, too, the assessments published

by the SSRC on the methodologies of the social sciences served as
guideposts for universities at large.
The SSRC also "lobbied" for the publication of social data
collected by the Census Bureau and other government offices handling
statistical studies.

This material was usually not available to

social scientists and prevented them from assessing evidence with such
a wide sample as that accumulated by the federal government.

Their

efforts pro'ved successful , and with the availability of wi de-samp 1e
statistics, the SSRC, with its cross-disciplinary staff of experts, made
great strides toward the assesment of social problems.

Merriam took

a strong stance on the involvement of social scientists in the analysis
of governmental concerns which, he felt, would eventually include social
scientists in the decision-making process.

One scholar notes:

It was obvious that social decisions and actions would be
taken with or without the application of knowledge. In the
absence of involvement by social scientists, the direction
of social change would be left to "the fanatic, radical,
or reactionary whose pattern fits him for propaganda rather
than science. 37
11

To prevent "the absence of involvement by social scientists" in the
formulation of nation policy, the SSRC, under the direction of Merriam,
functioned as a close observor of national policy.
It was not long, however, before Merriam received an even greater
opportunity for social science to work in a closer relationship with the
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national government.

In 1929, President Hoover requested a study of the

recent social trends of the country and established the Research
Conunittee on Social Trends. 38 Utilizing the key social thinkers from
the various social science institutes, Hoover named Mitchell as Chairman,
Merriam as Vice-Chairman, and William Ogburn, a prominent sociologist
on the staff of the SSRC, as Director of Research.

Consistent with his

policy of government "economy and efficiency", the President obtained
funding for the project from the Rockefeller Foundation and delegated
the bookkeeping duties to the SSRC administrative body.

For the first

time, a comprehensive analysis encompassing the entire range of social
science was initiated by the request of the Chief Executive o.f the
federal government.
Ironically the years from 1929 until late in 1932, when the major
report of the Colllllittee was published in Recent Social Trends in the
United States, proved disastrous for the nation's economy.

"Hoover had

never lacked for information about the economy and about the factors
of change and possible dislocation. 1139 Although it could be argued that
the information made .available to Hoover was incomplete, he had, during
the course of his long tenure in the federal government, accomplished
much success in improving the methods of economic forcasting.

He had

launched academic studies, updated the statistical services, established
colllllittees and conferences, and utilized experts and advisors.

Indeed,

as early as 1928, Hoover convened the Colllllittee on Recent Economic Changes ·
to survey and analyze the nation's economy. The report of the Committee, 40
issued in early 1929, warned the government of the possible danger of the
interdependent nature of the nation's economy regarding the imbalance of
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the different economic sectors on the overall economy.
underlined the necessity for equilibrium:

The report

"that through ignorance of

economic principles or through selfish greed, or inadequate leadership,
the steady balance will be disturbed to our economic detriment. •.4 1
Given this expert opinion, Hoover left it for the private sector to
digest and take the necessary precautions, since he saw the role and
function of the federal government in a

non~interventionist

light.

One student of the Hoover era illustrates the manner in which Hoover
utilized the intellectuals and experts:
The experts would gather, sift, and weigh the facts. But
the findings of these voluntary groups were not to be used
as a springboard for executive action. To use them for this
purpose, the President said, was "anathema." Instead, the
information was to be given to the people. When possessing
the facts, the people would judge.42
When the Great Depression finally crippled the nation's economy in
a seemingly irreversible fashion,

Hoov~r

attributed the major causes to

Europe's economic mismanagement and to speculations in the securities
market at home. 43 Since it was caused, in his estimation, by the
"selfish greed of a few" in the private sector, he felt that it was up
to the business co111J1unity to reform and fortify itself without reliance
on federal intervention, but rather through cooperation promoted and guided
by federal leadership. 44 Inaction did certainly not typify the administration of Herbert Hoover, but the executive actions taken did little
to reverse the economic chaos.

Philosophically bound to the credo of

American individualism and voluntarism of the private sector, .he never
carried his executive program to the point of government intervention which
hefeltwould have jeopardized the American system as he envisioned it.
In the final months of his administration, Hoover did expand the
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government's role in attempting to curb economic displacement by
sending "a series of legislative proposals to Congress to avert complete
collapse o.f the nation's economy; he asked for a cutback in government
expenditures, a sales tax, legislation to avert banking

and
bankruptcy, and authority to ease pressures on mortgage payments .•.4 5

But by then it was too late.

closur~s

His administration was drawing to a close,

and the economic outlook of the nation had never looked so bleak with
no significant relief realized or realistically anticipated.
These practices of Hoover present a paradoxical problem.

Throughout

the Twenties, Hoover was one of the leading advocates of the integration
of social science into the governmental decision-making process, yet
during the depression he failed to utilize the advice of the social
scientists .to reverse the disastrous economic trends of the nation
through government intervention. 46 Hoover repeatedly demonstrated
his respect for the methods and advances made by the social sciences in
I

the upgrading of the political process in their work of introducing
the means to formulate social and economic policy in an accurate and
~

intelligent fashion.

Yet his adherence to the outdated political

credo of individualism and voluntarism, coupled with his beliefs of
governmental non-intervention, prevented Hoover from performing the
necessary tasks required to bring the nation out of the depression, and,
more importantly, into the modern era.
During the initial years of the depression, the Research Committee
on Social Trends undertook not only an exhaustive investigation of the
social components of American life over the previous two decades,
but also addressed themselves to the task of making reconrnendations they
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deemed necessary for adoption by the federal government. 47

In their

findings, which encompassed a wide breadth of American social and
economic life, the social scientists stressed that the problems of the
social order stemmed from the fact that interrelated changes occuring
in society among its various components were "going forward in such
bewildering variety at various speeds" that a grave imbalance had displaced
the social equilibrium. 48 To even out the imbalances in the social
structure called for a conscious and concerted effort upon the part
of government as 11 the objective of any conscious control over the process
is to secure a better adjustment between inherited nature and culture. 11
The report of the Cormnittee further stated that the "means of social
control is social discovery and the wider adoption of new knowledge. 1149
In its suggestions and recorrmendations, the Conmittee proposed the
creation of a "National Advisory Council" which would include in its
membership" scientific, educational, governmental, and economic points
of contact . . . able to contribute to the consideration of the basic
social problems of the nation. 1150 Such a council would go beyond the
"purely economic planning" and the "purely governmental planning"
considerations, and provide a new synthesis for policy-making:
The new synthesis must include the scientific, the educational,
as well as the economic (including here the industrial, and
the agricultural) and also the governmental. All these factors
are inextricably intertwined in modern life, and it is impossible to make rapid progregy under present conditions without
drawing them all together •
. The Committee also proposed the reorganization of the executive branch
of the federal government as its existing structure prevented efficient
administration which was vital to meet and control the challenges of
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modern society.

In light of the failures of the federal government

to administer to the highly modernized American society, the Conmittee
looked for the advent of new types of government organization according
to the constitutionally defined branches of government, but also in
adherence to the demands of modern society.
might include:

Such governmental structures

"the quasi-governmental corporation, the government-owned

corporation, the mixed corporation, and the semi- and demi- autonomous
groupings in varying relations to the ' state. 1152 Such new advances by the
government into the private sector posed no threat for these students
of society as the movements would only be in keeping with the changes
already having taken place in society, and would enable the government
positively to enter into the modern era.
Not tied to the Hoover administration, which had not taken their
advice of the need for more effective government intervention and regulation of the economy, the Conmittee on Recent Social Trends looked to
the new administration of Franklin Roosevelt for the instigation of the
reform and direction the Conmittee members deemed necessary to lead the
nation out of the depression and into the modern era.

Though their

proposals were often vague and non-specific, the Conmittee advocated:
nothing less than the fullest application of knowledge and
intelligence to the whole decision-making process in society.
It proposed to apply the very methods that social scientists
had employed in writing Recent Social Trends to the formulation
of public policy: combining qualitative intrepretation of
trends with quantitative statistical measurements ~nd putting
them to work in making major political decisions. 5
The mood of the social science community at the coming of the new
administration was like that of the nation at large--expectant
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with the fierce hope that something would be done to rectify the national
economic failures.
The advances made by social sicence i.n research and methodology
during the Twenties as well as the role social sci:entists played in
their advisory capacities to government officials via the institutes
underlines a broader conception of the role of the social science
comnunity to the political structure.

During this period, whether it

was a conscious effort or not, the social science comnunity comprised
the beginnings of an effective counter-elite. According to elitist
thought, a counter-elite is the prototype of a new sort of personnel
reflecting ideas which are in conflict with the major assumptions or
methods employed by the ruling class, in this case businessmen and
their allies.

By the close of the decade, the main contentions of the

social science research groups throughout the country held that the
existing practices of executive authority were no longer effectively
governing the nation and called for the implementation of the new
synthesis of thought to reconstruct the chaotic climate of the nation's
social fabric.

As yet, social scientists were not given the opportunity

to chair the staffs of the political advisory comnittees which mold the
thought of the political leaders, but, during their interim out of
government in the Twenties, they fully prepared themselves for such roles
in the future.

They waited, anticipating the opportunity to carve out a

new alternative to the "savage dependence upon catastrophies for progress. 1154
And consistent to elite theory in the United States, the integration of
the social scientists into positions of political power was gradual
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and non-violent.

They found their opportunity to share rule and effect

change during the. presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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CHAPTER V
THE NEW DEAL AND THE NEW ELITE
The inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of the
United States in the spring of 1933 was a solemn occasion.

The mood

of the nation was a combination of desperation and insecurity nurtured
by the depression which, during its three year course, had adversely
affected the American people, turning the prosperity of the New Era into
a nightmare of unemployment, financial ruin, and despair. 1 Americans
viewed Roosevelt's ascendency to the presidency with both expectancy
and hope.

Keenly aware of the solemnity and the uncertainty which

characterized the nation on the day of his inauguration, Roosevelt
addressed the people of the United States in a serious and sober manner.
His address, more symbolic than

s~bstantive,

set the tone for his coming

· administration where, he promised, hope and recovery would replace
fear and retreat by means of a strong and positive course of action. 2
In this manner, Roosevelt launched the New Deal.
The election of Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932 marked the
culmination nf a political career which had begun years earlier. 3 Schooled
in the political atmosphere of Progressivism at the turn of the century,
Roosevelt expressed and fulfilled his Progressive orientation in political
service.

He served as a state senator in the legislature of New York,

as assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration, as the
unsuccessful Vice-Presidential running mate of James Cox in the election
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of 1920, and as Governor of New York during the four years preceeding
his bid for the presidency.

This road, from the privileged confines of

Hyde Park to the White House, prepared Roosevelt for the difficult task
of reversing the direction of the deflated economy.

More than any of

the political arts that he had so skillfully assimilated and adopted
on the way to the presidency, Roosevelt's ability to utilize the talents
of specialists and academic professionals provided the key to his understanding of the dilel11llas of the nation's economy when he assumed its
leadership.
During

~s

governorship, Roosevelt consulted frequently with college

professors, social scientists as well as public and private administrators
for guidance in the fonnulation of policy and legislative programs. 4
Roosevelt's achievements as governor in the areas of penal reform, farm
relief, banking regulation, state aid for the relief of the unemployed,
labor relations, unemployment compensation, and public utilities were
facilitated by the work of the many commissions staffed by professionals
whom he had recruited for the purposes of investigation and analysis. 5
His ability to recruit and utilize experts within the political framework
testified to both his political acumen and his administrative ability.
The affairs of the nation, however, were much more complex and
demanded the expertise of those able to deal, not only with the .technical
aspects of implementing policy, but also with the formulation of policy
broad enough to cover the economic exigencies of the entire nation as
well as the implications of foreign affairs.

Therefore, to assist him

in his quest for the presidency, Roosevelt established a "privy council"
of policy advisors under the direction of Samuel Roseman, his chief
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counsel in. Albany. 6 Roseman first contacted Raymond Moley, a professor
of Government at Barnard and Columbia Universities, and Basil O'Conner,
Roosevelt's former law partner.

Moley quickly established himself as

coordinator of the group and recruited two of his colleagues from
Columbia:

Rexford Tugwell, an expert on agricultural economics, and
'

.

Adolf Berle, Jr., whose comprehensive analysis, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, was published and highly acclaimed that sunrner.
This "privy council , 11 later coined "brain trust" by James Kiernan
of the New York Times, conferred weekly with Roosevelt in Albany, arguing
economic theory, drafting memoranda, and composing campaign speeches.
Although th.ese five comprised the nucleus of the brain trust, others were
consluted and often sent their ideas and plans via memoranda to the group
for discussion even if not attending themselves. 7 From Roosevelt's point
of view, these meetings served several purposes:
In the first place, they enabled Roosevelt to clarify his
own thinking on the major economic problems, tendencies, and
forces of the time. Secondly, they brought him up-to-date
on most viewpoints and proposed solutions for the problems;
there were few proposals that the brain trust discussions seem
to have missed. In the third place, they opened U§ new avenues
of policy that had not been considered previously.
These conferences were equally valuable for the members of the brain
trust.

As a forum for the expression of the economic theories and methods

which had developed and expanded during the Twenties, the meetings with
Roosevelt provided the brain trust a political framework within which
their ideas could be analyzed and developed.

These men, schooled in the

philosophy of John Dewey and Herbert Croly which stressed "that organized
social intelligence could shape society, 119 found in Roosevelt, initially
in the Albany meetings, a po 1i ti ci an wi 11 i ng to weigh the soundness of
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their counsel i From the beginning, the need and reliance was evenly
balanced between Roosevelt and his staff of intellectuals. As "social
engineers, 1110 the members of the brain ·trust possessed the knowledge to
formulate new policies and programs; and Roosevelt, as "master politician,"
possessed the skill and the opportunity to translate that theory into
a political reality.

This relationship, successfully conceived in A1bany

on the eve of Roosevelt's nomination for the presidency, forshadowed the
academic and professional mobilization in Washington, D. C. which
continued throughout the entire course of the New Deal.
Roosevelt won the Democratic Party nomination in Chicago and
launched a spirited campaign. 11 He traversed the nation exposing a
•ifresh pers·o nality, fresh ideas, and fresh hope. 1112 Although Roosevelt
had yet to clearly formulate cohesive administrative policies, he neverthe less articulated a cautious new direction for the federal government
throughout all of his major addresses:
At Columbus, Ohio, . . . : reciprocal trade agreements and
reduced tariffs, supervision of sales of securities, security
exchanges and bank deposits, separation of investment banking
from co11111ercial banking.
At Sea Girt, New Jersey.

repeal of prohibition amendment.

At Topeka, Kansas . . . : a program of agricultural relief,
planned land use, refinancing of farm mortgages.
At Sa 1t La.ke City. . . : a program for relief of the rail roads.
At Portland, Oregon . . • : public development of water power
and supervision of public utilities; control of public utilities
holding companies.
At Detroit, Michigan . . . : social justice through social
action.
At Albany . . . : government responsibility for relief and
unemployment distress, public works to lessen unemployment,
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unemployment insurance, better housing, health as a concern
of the federal government.
At Pittsburg . . . : balancing the budget.
At Springfield . . . : relief for agriculture by raising farm
prices, reducing its taxes, and lightening its burden of
farm mortgages.
At St. Louis, Missouri . . . : plans for helping the eight
great credit groups of the nation.
At Boston . . . : comprehensive program for unemployment,
emergency relief, temporary public works, employment exchanges, 13
reduction of work day and of work week, unemployment insurance.
Throughout Roosevelt's entire campaign, the brain trust drafted his
speeches, and continued to voice and exhaust opinions on policy formation. 14
If the campaign schooled Roosevelt in the intellectual consideration
necessitated by his candicacy to the presidency during distressing times,
it also educated the brain trust in the political realities of the
early Thirties.

During this period preceding the election, the working

relationship between Roosevelt and his brain trust strengthened, and, in
the following few months, a new chapter in the political history of the
United States began.
Roosevelt won an overwhelming victory in the presidential election
of 1932, claiming an edge in popular votes of over seven million and
carrying forty-two states.

During the interregnum, Roosevelt relied

on the brain trust to interview specialists and prepare drafts for the
initial legislation of the "Hundred Days. 1115 As the heir-apparent of
the vast political machinery of the federal government, Roosevelt had many
political considerations as well as policy directives to coordinate.
The presence of Roosevelt's brain trust during his campaign had sparked
widespread objections among the media and the political centers of the
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Democratic Party who feared both a government in the hands of intellectuals
and a breakdown in the system of party .patronage. 16 Roosevelt, drawing
on his vast political experience, recognized the need to incorporate
intellectuals and social engineers into the system as well as the political
practicalities of awarding prominent loyal party supporters with
the fruits of his victory.
political suicide.

To have done otherwise would have been

Therefore, during the interregnum, Roosevelt

selected his appointees carefully, and established a delicate balance of
traditionalism and liberalism among his chief lieutenants.
The selection of a cabinet provided a key opportunity for Roosevelt
to gather and sustain political support for his oncoming admi .n istration.
What was noteworthy in naming the cabinet was Roosevelt's genius for
"giving something to everybody."

He divided these presitigious appoint-

ments among men of seniority in the Democratic Party, geographical representatives, and spokesmen of the new groups of social action. 17 Of the
ten member cabinet, seven positions were filled with conservative old-line
Democrats; and the remaining three were staffed with liberals symbolizing
the new prototype of personnel in the federal government.

Cordell Hull,

Claude Swanson, and Daniel Roper appointed to the Departments of State,
Navy, and Conmerce respectively, completed the southern contingent in the
cabinet.

Save for Cordell Hull, who had demonstrated his skilled talents

of negotiation throughout his congressional career, the importance of this
contingent was more in its prestige among Southerners than in the
capabilities of its membership.

To direct the Departments of Treasury

and Justice, Roosevelt turned to William Woodin, industrialist, and
Homer S. Cummings, senior lawyer.

Both of conservative persuasion, but
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nevertheless ardent Roosevelt supporters, they were selected as
representatives of the northeast quadrant.

To satisfy the patronage

demands of the Democratic Party, Roosevelt named James A. Farley,
Democratic National Party Chairman, and Gov. George H. Dean of Utah,
longtime advocate of the spoils system, to the top
Departments of Post Office and War.

posts in the

This traditional approach of

selection for the majority of the cabinet consolidated and strengthened
Roosevelt's position among his party.

Tugwell, a Roosevelt advisor

during this period, conwnents on Roosevelt's initial appointments:
His first selections were obviously intended to consolidate
his coalition and to make it likely that even the most
reluctant members would accept his directions. It was
weighted heavily with southerners whose support he had to
have--southerners would chair all congressional committees-and who would be the most reluctant to swallow the medicine
he expected to prescribe.18
Roosevelt turned to the faction representing the new prototype
of politicians--the aspiring liberal activists, for the remainder of
his cabinet appointees.

To fill the head positions in Agriculture,

Interior, and Labor, he selected Henry A. Wallace, "a symbol of reform in
the agricultural picture," Harold Ickes, a leading Midwestern political
reformer, and Frances Perkins, a labor authority in the state cabinet
of New York.

On the whole, Roosevelt's Cabinet did not reflect any

but political interests.

His scheme to consolidate support and fortify

his own position through the symbolic appointments to the cabinet served
him well during the early years of his administration.
deployed the none too popular or politically expedient
business lea.dership t~, posts abroad. 19 Prominent businessmen of the
Roose~elt

Democratic Party had generously supported Roosevelt's bid for the
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presidency, and such support was traditionally repaid with a cabinet
or hi,gh ranking position in government.

To ward off possible conflicts

or administrative difficulties with a representative of business among
his chief lieutenants, Roosevelt defied tradition and offered less
sensitive positions instead.

Because of this policy, Jesse Straus,

who awaited his api:oirtment to the Department of Conmerce, went instead
to head the embassy in Paris.

Such was also the case for David H. Morris

who went to Belgium, and Barry Bingham who headed the delegation in London.
Behind the symbolic appointments of the· interregnum were,

more

significantly, the appointments of officials who would chart the course
of Roosevelt's initial recovery program. · As the chief executive was
not a.llowed, by law, in 1933 to employ administrative assistants,
Roosevelt appointed Maley to Assistant Secretary of State and Tugwell
to Assistant Secretary of Agriculture in order to keep the nucleus of
his brain trust centered in Washington.

Similarly, Adolf Berle, Jr.,

served as a special advisor to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).
The chief concern, in the days surrounding the inauguration, was
the formulation of policy to meet and reverse the economic crisis.

As

political scientist Charles E. Jacobs notes:
It was a situation that called for imaginative thinking
and purposeful act ion. . . And it was the necessity for this
action that demanded the talents and skills of men with
inventive minds and trained in the expertise of the social
sciences as well as the law. Mere managers or caretakers
would no 102aer satisfy the demands made upon the American
government.
So after cloaking his new administration with a traditional facade in
the appointments of his Cabinet, Roosevelt, through Moley, 21 mobilized
the intellectuals and 11 men of vision" for suggestions on specific policy
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strategies to cope with the numerous problems in agriculture, industry,
and finance.

The call for help also went out to the institutes, which,

since the Twenties, had performed invaluable research tasks for the
government.

In January of 1933 Roosevelt wrote to Harold Moulton,

director of the Brookings Institution:

"quite frankly, we need help.

Because I know of the splendid work that has been done by you and the
Institt1te, and because of my old friendship for Mr. Brookings, I am
hoping that you will be able to give us assistance in the preparation
of a fairly definite plan between now and early March. 1122
From his quarters in the Carlton Hotel preceding the inauguration,
and from his offices in the State Department, thereafter, Maley sorted
through the memoranda on policy directives sent Roosevelt and interviewed specialists to staff the administration.

The general approach

to future economic policy, which would stipulate moderate planning and
experimentation, was largely set by Maley, Tugwell, and Berle previous
to the inauguration, and the specific counsel sought was molded to
these 1i nes.

In the view of Wi 11 i am E. Leuchtenburg, "by the ti me

Roosevelt took office, he and his advisors had developed or familizarized
themselves with a body of theory a good deal more coherent than is
commonly suggested. 1123 Convinced that "organized social intelli.gence"
was the lever by which society could be understood, and then subsequently
shaped to a positive advantage, the New Dealers began work to overhaul
the badly depressed economy.
The fi.rst hundred days legislation illustrated the political
intellectual 'mesh which characterized Roosevelt's administration.
enactment of the Agricultural Adjustment Act {AAA) set the tone for

The
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agricultural economics which, on the federal level, was promoted by
skilled economists and lawyers. 24 M. L. Wilson, an economist from
Montana State College and member of The Bureau of Agricultural Economics
during the Twenties, impressed Tugwell and 'Maley with his plan to limit
farm production by domestic allotment.

In the new administration he

was retained as chief of the Wheat Division of the Department of
Agriculture.

Together with Wallace, Tugwell, and a group of economists

and legal experts,* Wilson played a major role in shaping agricultural
policy which, initially capstoned by the AAA, regulated farm production
through controls on marketing and processing.

With his influence over

the Bureau of Agriculutral Economics already established in the Department,
Wilson utilized the Bureau for the coordination of research and policymaking which was vital to the successful enactment of the AAA.

As one

historian comments:
The Bureau provided support for the AAA . . . and it had
ties with other agencies as well, since many of the
Bureau's staffs were transferred to planning positions
throughout the Department . . . . The Bureau also undertook sociological studies to determine the best means of

*Members of the liberal contingent in the Department of Agricultural
included: Mordecai Ezekiel, an economic advisor; William I. Myers,
former Professor of Farm Finance at Cornell, the chief author of the
Farm Mortgage Act; Herman Okiphant, former professor of Law at John
Hopkins; Gardiner C. Means, professor of Finance at Columbia; Louis
Bean of the staff of Bureau of Agricultural Economics; Howard E.
Babcock, former professor of Marketing at Cornell; Adlai Stevenson,
legal advisor from Chicago Law; Thunnond Arnold and Abe Fortas from
Yale Law School; Alger Hiss, Lee Pressman, John Abt, Nathan Witt
from Harvard Law, and Jerome Frank, lawyer and author of the brilliant
study Law and the Modern Mind, served as the General Counsel. Unofficial
observer, The New Dealers (New York, 1934), pp. 74-104.
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inducing farmers to participate in the Department's programs
under AAA . . . , and this led to further provisions for the
kind of federal-state-local community cooperation that had
been encouraged by the Department of Agriculture since its
first connections with the land grant colleges and extension
services. These sociological studies were later supplemented
by a series of attitude and opinion surveys conducted by a unit
especially organized for this work, the Division of Program
survey headed by Rensis Likert, the first such ·u nit to be
established in any government agency.25
The crisis in both industry and finance called for immediate
remedial action on the federal level.

Mobilizing experts in the

Treasury Department, such as O. M. W. Sprague, former professor of
Banking and Finance at Harvard (specialist Assistant to the Secretary),
James H. Rogers, professor of Political Economy at Yale (a currency
specialist and consultant to Treasury), George F. Warren, professor of
Farm Management at Cornell (a commodity dollar specialist and
consultant to Treasury), and Dean Acheson, a legalist under Louis Brandeis
(Under Secretary of the Treasury), Roosevelt organized a talented team
from which he solicited advice. 26 These men were selected for their
expertise as well as their distance from Wall Street financial circles
which had proved incapable of meeting the economic crisis.

Initially,

'

Roosevelt relied on Warren and Rogers, who had recently published the
study, America · Weighs Her Gold, ·for a monetary policy to raise the
deflated dollar.

Warren's theory argued that the principal reason for

the prolonged nature of the depression was chiefly because of the
government's failure to purchase gold which would have raised the value
of the colTlllOdity dollar and general price level.

Convinced of the

plausibility of Warren's thesis (which was supported by Rogers), Roosevelt
engaged in the price fixing of gold on a day-to-day basis for several
weeks.

The experiment did little to solve the financial dilemma, but
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it did illustrate Roosevelt's willingness to seek advice from his
academic experts.
To provide some semblance of sound financial stability in his
administration, Roosevelt chose

Lewi~

Doublas who had made his mark

in Congress as a young but determined budget-balancer.

The Economy Bill 27

of Roosevelt's first Congress was largely the handiwork of Douglas.
Though it was Douglas' triumph in that it drastically cut the federal
budget, its enactment was also a victory for Roosevelt.

Cloaked with

orthodox financial policy, the measure brought to its support the
11

tory factions who might otherwise have opposed its provision to
11

grant Roosevelt wide discretionary powers.

The measure satisfied the

conservative opposition and bought Roosevelt time to formulate an
inflationary policy which would promote recovery on a more widespread
basis than the Warren-Rogers scheme.
Administrative planning for industrial recovery brought to the
federal government still another group of high-level theorists. 28
What eventually became the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
emerged from a series of debates and compromises carried on in the
advisory councils of the Executive office.

Efforts to devise a pl an

employing broad cooperation with the business community centered around
the office of Maley who, while officially serving as the Assistant
Secretary of State, became the unofficial
11

recovery plans.

11

clearinghouse for industrial

He seriously investigated the problem, calling upon

the Brookings Institution for advice, and enlisting the aid of General
Hugh Johnson .whose experience on the War Industries Board during
World War I served as a comparable project for precedent as well as
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enlightenment.

The NIRA resulted chiefly from these discussions attended

by such personnel as Tugwell; Moley; Harold Moulton, a Brookings
Institution economist; David Podell and Gilbert Montague, trade association
1awyers; W. Jett Louk, 1abor economist; Dona 1d Rich berg, 1abor 1awyer;
General Hugh Johnson; and Frances Perkins among others.

Ellis Hawley,

historian of the NIRA, writes:
The final version contained something for nearly all of
its principal authors. The authority to formulate codes
. of fair competition satisfied the business planners.
Section 7A, with its promise of collective bargaining and
minimum labor standards, made the measure attractive to
the trade unions and social workers. The provision for
federal licensing gave some hope for national economic
planning. And a $3,3000,000,000 public war~~ program
appealed · to the spenders and pump primers.
As illustrated by the enactment of the NIRA, business and industry
were viewed in a partnership with government to reverse the economic
trends of the depression.

The financial conmunity, however, warranted

no such standing with federal policy-makers •mder Roosevelt who
insisted that the financiers be disciplined. 30 With the legal advice
of James Landis, professor of Legislation at Harvard Law School, and
Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen, brilliant young Harvard Law graduates,
the Administration produced first the Securities Act of 1933, and later
the more comprehensive measure, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Reporting and disclosure requirements were made in order to regulate
trading practices and to eliminate the possibility of inside manipulation-a practice which had been disclosed in the Pecora Hearings on the stock
market and banking cofl1Tlunity. 31
Regional planning, a long standing concern with the federal
government, received a strong endorsement from Roos eve 1t when, ii1 the
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midst of the hundred days legislative activity, he signed the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) legislation. 32 Heavily influenced by Arthur E.
Morgan, an engineer who had designed the Miami Conservancy District for
flood control prior to World War I, and more recently the President
of Antioch College in Ohio during the Twenties, Roosevelt opted for a
multipurpose appraoch for the regional control of the Tennessee Valley.
His scheme, combining social and physical planning, went far beyond the
long-standing federal debate over the concerns of power and fertilizer
production.

The provisions of the TVA were far-reaching and novel by

any previous federal standards.

As a corporation, the TVA was "clothed

with the power of a government but possessed of the flexibility and
initiative of a private enterprise. 1133 Section 23 of the Act summarizes
its broad implications"
. . . for the especial purpose of bringing about in said
Tennessee drainage basin and adjoining territory . . . (l)
the maximum amount of flood control; (2) the maximum
development . . . for navigation purposes; (3) the maximum
generation of electric power consistent with flood control
and navigation; (4) the proper use of marginal lands;
(5} the proper method of reforestation . . . and (6) the
economic and social well-being of the people living in said
river basin _35
These legislative enactments illustrate the principal administrative
achievements of Roosevelt's first hundred days in office.

Out of these

laws came a proliferation of alphabetic agencies which were provided
for, under law, to administer the newly enacted measures.

To head these

agencies Roosevelt turned to a new group of men whose supervisory talents
were needed to put the brain-children of the intellectuals into operation.
Of these men Charles E. Jacobs observes:
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This second skill group was made up of those either
trained in, or naturally adept at the task of management
and organization on a small scale. These supervisory types,
or "bosses," were responsible for getting the grand
programs thought up by these brain trusters and enacted
by Congress--implemented into reality. And, although
as a general class of administrators, their intellects
may have been less sparkling than those of the Tugwells,
Corcorans and Berles, the mission they were called upon to
perform w~~ equally important and therefore just as
valuable.
The very nature of these New Deal experiments, enacted during a high
point in Roosevelt's popularity, demanded "imaginative but cautious
administrators.

11

Therefore, in order to withstand the criticisms and

objections that would undoubtedly arise with the implementation
of his unprecendented programs, Roosevelt mobilized a group of
"sharp-eyed supervisors."
The new public works program was an example of the type of
legislation which required an administrator of this caliber. 36
11

Honest Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, possessed these
11

qualities in abundance.

Title II of the NIRA provided for a Public

Works Administration (PWA) to initiate construction projects directly
and to allot loans and matching federal grants to states and other
public entities to promote wide-scale construction.

Ickes held

tightly to the purse strings of his $3.3 billion appropriation, and, as
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. surmises, "read every line of everything
and often fired documents back with demands for revision . . . Ickes
meanwhile called on PWA employees to report on each other, denounced
them for coming late to work or taking too long for coffee, and even
issued an edict against pulling down shades over the windows in office
doors. 1137 Although it has been argued that Ickes failed in his economic
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function of producing wide-scale employment at a fast pace, 38 he did
fulfill Roosevelt's need for an administrator who could both develop
an organization and keep its channels free from corruption.
Working in close proximity to Ickes were Harry Hopkins, Federal
Emergency Relief Act (FERA) administrator, and General Hugh Johnson,
National Recovery Act (NRA) administrator.

In charge of doling out

relief, Hopkins managed to direct a large proportion of the funds for
work relief--assigning unemployed teachers to teaching jobs as well
as providing funds to local self-help and barter associations.

Due

to Hopkins' amazing organizational talents, Roosevelt allocated
PWA funds for an extended works relief project under his direction
which became the Civil Works Administration (CWA). 39
The task facing General Hugh Johnson of implementing the fair
practices codes under the NIRA proved much more cumbersome. 40 His
administrative skills, though, developed on the War Industries Board
during the first World War, served him well.

With the assistance of

his chief lieutenants,* he hit the industrial strongholds of the nation
by a storm, and before the end of the year held agreements from most
of the major industries.
*Among the group to aid him in setting up the NRA codes, Johnson
solicited the help of: Donald Richberg, labor lawyer as chief counsel
to NRA; Col. Robert Lea, formerly of the War Industries Board during
World War I as Assistant Administrator for Industry; Alvin Brown,
Assistant Director of the Budget as Assistant Administrator of the NRA;
Edward McGrady, AF of L veteran legislative agent as Assistant Administrator
in charge of labor; Kenneth M. Simpson, geologist from Columbia in charge
of the mining and drilling industries; William Averell Harriman, railroad
magnate in charge of heavy industries; Sol Rosenblatt, Harvard Law graduate
in charge of amusements and various industries; Arthur Whiteside, founder
of the National Credit Bureau as head of textiles, wholesale and retail;
and William Davis, legal advisor to the War Department as National
Compliance Director. Unofficial observer, The New Dealers, pp. 28-74.
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There were also cases where Roosevelt based his selection of
administrators more on "previous experience than on any guarantee of
manageria 1 expertise. ,.4 l

Such was the case for the appointment of Joseph P.

Kennedy to head the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) where his
contacts among the financial elite facilitated the acceptance of
SEC regulations among the financial community. 42 Jesse Jones, head of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), provided a similar
function.

As a Texas banker and industrialist, his presence did much

to abate conservative fears that the New Deal would be in the practice
of handing out billions of dollars and undermining capitalism. 43
Occasionally, the intellectual/administrator relationship was
not characterized by harmony.

As head of the AAA, George Peek alienated

most of the academic and liberal faction brought into the Department
of Agriculture by Roosevelt. 44 Peek was an advocate of "the old school
of McNary-Haugenism which saw its mission as a single-minded devotion
to the cause of raising farm prices, regardless of the effect on the rest
of the nation's economy or that of the world . ..4 5 This was an anathema
to his planning conscious subordinates* who were trying to instigate
fclr-reachi ng economic reforms in the agricul tura 1 sector of the economy.
With the intercession of Tugwell and Wallace, Peek was removed to a
less sensitive position in the administration in the State Department--a
typical Rooseveltian gesture to appease both sides and what they represented.
Of significance in this case, though, is that the social engineers won
an overwhelming victory in demanding an administrator who would support
and administer the fruits of their labor.
*See explanatory footnote on Page 77.

'
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To direct his own creation, the TVA, Roosevelt selected men
highly qualified for the job. 46 For chainnan of the three man board,
Roosevelt appointed A. E. Morgan who proved indispensable in shaping
his conceptualizations about the TVA in its planning stages.

As a

civil engineer and flood control expert, he was designated to carry out
the dam construction projects and oversee the social and economic planning
of the valley.

Similarly Harcourt Morgan was chosen to administer the

agricultural production due chiefly to his experiences as director of the
University of Tennessee Agricultural Experiment Station during the
decades since the turn of the century.

And for counsel and director of

the power and utilities function of TVA, Roosevelt secured David Lilienthal,
one of Felix Frankfurter's protoges and former head of Wisconsin's Public
Utility Comnission.

These appointments were hailed by the social engineers

of the new administration as ones both of vision and necessity.

As an

experiment in broad federal intervention into the private sector, only
men cognizant of the dictates of planning and research would be able
to administer it to its fullest potential.

And in the beginning much

hope was placed in the hands of these individuals.

But the appointment

of A. E. Morgan as director soon created problems. 47 As chief advocate
and developer of the measure, his aspirations for the measure soon
surpassed the provisions of the law.

Subsequently a split ensued

between A. E. Morgan and H. A. Morgan and Lilienthal.

Analyzing the

potential seriousness of the split, Roosevelt eventually replaced
A. E. Morgan with Lilienthal as director of the TVA.
The passage and enactment of these measures of the first hundred
days of the New Deal, while not irreversably turning the tide of the
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depression, did raise the hope of the nation far beyond the despair
that had characterized it a hundred days earlier.

In this the first

hundred days was a success even though the measures enacted had yet to
solve the economic dilerrmas.

Despite the talent and energy which went

into this legislative effort to rectify the economy, real problems
in administrative coordination persisted, at times crippling the political
machinery to inaction and policy contradiction.

To provide some admini-

strative unity among all the alphabetic agencies created during 1933,
Roosevelt~

Council

by executive order, established the National Emergency
(NEC). 48

The membership of the NEC included the administrators of all of
the various agencies, the Secretaries of Interior, Conunerce, Agriculture,
and

L~bor,

·and Dr. Winfield Riefler, a statistician from the Central

Statistical Board (CSB) to assure standard statistical reporting by all
the administrative agencies.

Donald Richberg, chief counsel to the NRA,

was appointed as director whose function was to develop an agenda of the
various subjects under discussion in preparation for the meetings.

One

of the ini.tial tasks of the NEC was to provide some form of consistency
among the functions of the agencies in order to prevent overlapping
and contradiction.

For example, the reclamation features of the TVA

clearly contradicted the intentions of the crop control features of the
AAA, and the NRA regulations pertaining to the timber industry adversely
affected both1he Federal Housing Authority (FHA) in its drive for home
remodeling and the public works clearance projects of the PWA. 49 The
attempts at coordination through the NEC, primarily by its requirement
for each executive agency to clear all legislative proposals through
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the NEC, railed chiefly by the · repeated resistance of the newer
agencies to coordinate.

The coordination of activities would have

necessitated compromise which during the emergency would have jeopardized
the flexibility needed to meet the economic crisis.

If anything, the

~

NEC provided a meeting place for the airing of cross-agency conflicts and
administrative shortcomings.

In this function, it was a "school for

policy-makers, giving some structure to the range of programs that
resisted fonnalization.
test paid off.

The educative experience by any pragmatic

For all of its administrative untidiness, the New Deal

harrmered through new structural changes. 115

°

For the newly emerging

political elite, this training in administrative management, provided
by the

NEC~

served as an invaluable lesson in political survival. And

for Roosevelt, the NEC clearly demonstrated the need for a permanent
solution to the organizationl dilerrmas of the executive branch, which
with the additions of the new agencies, had expanded to unmanageable
proportions.
As the previous pages reveal, during Roosevelt's first year in
office, a group of social scientists and legalists, as well as professional
administrators converged in Washington to chart the path back to recovery.
These men, as illustrated, were carefully compartmentalized into various
departments and agencies to advise, and at times direct administrative
policy.

And, typical of bureaucratic rivalry, their influence was most

often narrowly confined to the offices they served.

Although the NEC

did little to consolidate their efforts, at least one experiment of the
New Deal, free from departmental or agency responsibility, did--
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the National Resource Cotrmittee (NRC).*
The NRC was established as an advisory committee for the various
agencies created under the NIRA. 51 Its membership included: Frederic
Delano, uncle of the President, a trustee of the Brookings Institution
and activist in city and regional planning; Charles Merriam, founder and
director of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and member of the
staff of the Recent Social Trends Conmittee; Wesley Mitchell, of the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Beardsley Ruml, Dean of
Social Sciences at the University of Chicago; and Henry Dennison and
Thomas Yantis, industrialists dedicated to the objectives of planning
based on research. After the NIRA advisory boards were reorganized in
1934, the NRC was made into an advisory conmittee with active charge
of its own program.

Although much of the work of its early years dealt

with coordination in the development of natural resources and conservation
at the request of Roosevelt, the NRC, nevertheless, managed to establish
a limited social science clearinghouse in the federal government due
chiefly thorugh the NRC's ties with the institutes via Merriam,
Delano, Mitchell, and Ruml.

Relying on the staffs of the various

institutes for much of their technical and research work, the NRC
continually demonstrated throughout the Thirties the need for social
science intelligence gathering as an instrument for policy-making.

The

institutes provided the analyses, and Delano and Merriam, who had easy
access to the President, aired the findings to the administration.
Among some of the studies undertaken during the depression by the
institutes were:

housing, medicine, health, effects of the depression

*The original title of the NRC was The National Resources Planning
Board.
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on the nation, business cycles, crime, 52 and, more notably, the
Brookings series on NRA by Leverett S. Lyons and on AAA by Bdwin G.
Nourse. 53 Although Roosevelt at times disagreed with the findings,
'

he recognized the need for federal access to research.

54

It was

within the ranks of the NEC that Roosevelt first corrmissioned a study
on the reorganization of the executive branch to provide some coherency
in executive policy necessitated by the growing responsibility of the
federal government.
If the Twenties provided an apprenticeship for this emerging
political elite of academics, legalists, and public administrators, then
· the in it i a.l two yea rs of the New Dea 1 provided them with the po 1it i ca 1
skills to advance through journeyman stages.

Although disharmony and

disagreement often characterized this new mobilization, it was more
in tactic than in strategy.

All agreed that the utilization of social

tntelligence could alter the despair that symbolized the status quo,
and all were at work to chart this new course to recovery.

Tempered by

the shortcomings of this initial effort, and encouraged by the endorsement
of the ·1934 elections, this fledging political elite sought new methods
to solve the still persistent economic crisis.
By the time the 74th Congress convened in Washington in the fall
of 1934, Raymond Maley, a member and organizer of the original brain
trust, had become a casualty of the new regime. 55 As a political appointee
in the State Department, Maley was not able to escape the running battle
between the political appointees and the career diplomats.

And as a

member of the delegation at the London Economic Conference, he performed
"the unpardonable indiscretion of corrmitting to a cablegram a frank
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analysis of the delegation. 1156 Therefore, he officially resigned in
September of 1933, but, as a private citizen working out of Columbia,
he continued to offer advice to the administration.

The resignation

of Maley underlined the political adaptability required to serve the
federal government in the days before administrative assistants were
allowed the presi.dent.

And although "conservatives of various stripes

gleefully proclaimed the disintegration of the .celebrated brain trust,
and hopefully forecast a retreat from the innovations of the New Deal, 1157
no such occurance took place.

By the time Maley left office, the new

elite of academics and professionals had become an established fixture
in federal politics.
During 'the second hundred days legislative period, Roosevelt moved
from the initiation of primarily emergency and relief measures to the
incorporation of reform bii'ls aimed at promoting recovery through the
alteration of existing abu~es in the system. 58 After the Schechter Decision
of the Supreme Court invalidated the NIRA 59 in early 1935, Roosevelt
pushed for major changes in the existing banking, tax, and holding
company laws as well as the enactment of social security legislation.
Sunmoning his advisers from the -Treasury Department, Roosevelt called
for a rea·ssessment of the tax laws. 60 The drafting session included
Herman Oliphant, general counsel to Treasury and long time associate
and follower of Louis Brandeis; Raymond Maley, down from Columbia on
special assignment; Felix Frankfurter, from the Harvard Law faculty, and
members of the Treasury staff. * The resultant measure aimed at
*See page 78 of this chapter for a discussion of the personnel
staffing the Treasury Department.
·
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distributing more evenly the national income by the incorporation of
a graduated income tax imposing greater taxes on high private and corporate
incomes and profits.

After congress i ona 1 debate and approva 1 , the Wea 1th

Tax Act of 1935 adopted the provisions of increased gift and capital stock
taxes, the initiation of. the excise profits taxes, and the levying of a
steep surtax.

Although the measure did little to redistribute income

during the Thirites, it established the precedent for the utilization of
tax policy as an instrument of social policy, and in this respect was at
least a limited victory for the social engineers.
During this congressional session of 1935, Roosevelt also recorrmended
an extensive consideration of his social security measure. 61

For

Roosevelt, the origins of his idea for a social insurance program were
deep-rooted.

As governor of New York, he had investigated the possibilities
for such a program, but saw no fruition in his endeavors. 62 In the sunVT1er

of 1934, Roosevelt convened the Conmittee on Economic Security under the
leadership of Frances Perkins to draft a measure of social insurance
suitable to the needs of the nation.* The Conmittee approved a program
of contributory old-age insurance and unemployment compensation patterned
*The formal membership of the Committee included: the Secretaries
of Labor, Agriculture, Treasury, Justice, and Harry Hopkins, administrator
of the relief program; Other personnel involved in the Convnittee's work
were: Professor Edwin Witte of the University of i~isconsin, research
director in charge of technical assistance which included economists,
analysts, lawyers, clerical, and statistical experts from every executive
department; Isador Lubin, chief economic advisor; Katherine Lenroot, head
of the Children's Bureau as chief social analyst; and Tom Eliot, assistant
solicitor of the Department of Labor as chief legal advisor. Two experts-Andre Tixier and Oswald Stein who had studied every welfare system in the
world-~were called in for advising. Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I
~(New York, 1946), pp. 287 ... 292 ,
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after the Wisconsin plan which provided for a joint federal-state system
of supplying aid to the unemployed.

Congress passed the Conmittee's

proposal with minimal opposition, and on August 15, 1935 the Social
Security Administration was established.

The Act created a compulsory

old-age insurance program whereby workers, at the age of sixty-five,
received retirement benefits financed by taxes on their wages and on their
employer's payroll tax.

A special provision also set up a program of

compensation to the unemployed, dependent mothers and children, the
handicapped, and those aged not covered by Social Security.

To organize

and direct this system, 63 Roosevelt called upon Henry Seidemann of the
Brookings Institution who had previously

d~signed

the accounting and

control system for payroll taxes and benefit payments for the Corrmittee
on Economic Security.

With the full enactment of the Social Security

measure, the United States became a welfare state, based both on
capitalism and federal responsibility to the social and economic
well-being of its citizenry. 64
The second hundred days also produced a measure precipitating the
abolition of holding companies which controlled utility monopolies. 65
Benjamin Cohen and Thomas Corcoran, legal advisors and principal
drafters of the SEC, introduced a piece of legislation for the Administration to eliminate the holding company empires that "fleeced the consumer,
corrupted legislatures, and, by their elusive operation, evaded state
regulation. 1166 The Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, which
resulted from Cohen and Corcoran's efforts, eliminated all holding
companies twice removed, and authorized the SEC to compel the registration
of all existing holding companies in order to supervise all financial
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transactions.

By means of this enactment, the Rural Electrification

Administration (REA) was able to produce cheap electricity to four
out of every ten American farms. 67
The banking bill of the 74th Congress originated chiefly through
the efforts of Marriner Eccles whom Roosevelt had appointed to the
Federal Reserve Board. 68 As a result of his experiences on the Board,
Eccles, himself a banker from Utah, felt that the Federal Reserve System
only served the interests of the banking conmunity rather than the
nation at large.

To promote recovery, Eccles urged a reorganization of

the System where the monetary mechanism could be used to secure business
stability through conscious control and management. The Banking Act of
1935 69 established many of Eccles proposals and centered the authority
of the Federal Reserve system in the Board of Governors which provided
for a national standardization of rediscount rates and reserve requirements-the mainstays of currency and credit.

And, by requiring all existing

institutions to join the Federal Reserve system by 1942, the Act
established the framework for stronger monetary policy on the federal
level.
These enactments of the second hundred days firmly established the
foundations of the New Deal which provided the nation with a· welfare
state based on the dictates of capitalism ·and the federal supervision
and instigation of social and economic policy.

Except for the passage

in the later New Deal years of the Soil Conservation and Domestic
A11 otment Act ,7° and the Fair Labor Standards Act ,7 1 the domestic
New Deal remained virtually unchanged during Roosevelt's succeeding
administrations.
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This New Deal experiment, chiefly written by the newly mobilized
elite in Washington, created the framework for federal stabilization of
the economic and social forces of the nation.

In many ways, the programs

fell short of achieving a return to the prosperity of the previous
decade, but that the federal governl!l!nt assumed the responsibility of the
nation's leadership ushered in a new age in American history.

This new

era in federal policy, based on the precepts of social knowledge and
the new methods in social science paved the way for the possibility of
a more stabilized economic and social environment in the United States.
This experiment, started in the Thirties, would reach maturity in later
decades.
The stimulus for this experiment in national economic recovery
came chiefly from the personnel schooled in the universities and
institutes of social planning which had demonstrated the need for social
intelligence to direct poliey- and decision-making on the federal level.
By recruiting these men and those of the older elite who shared similar
sentiments,* Roosevelt gave them an active role in the creation of
federal policies.

And by recommending the policies and views of this

elite into political reality, Roosevelt played a significant role in
shaping the contours of a new elite in Washington.

By 1935, national

policies revolved around the newly created welfare state which
significantly altered the responsibilities of the federal government.
This new state, a political reality in 1935, having evolved from Progressive aspirations and the work of Roosevelt's extended brain trust,
*Personnel of the older, established elite who were assimilated into
the new mobilization were men such as Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman,
and Joseph P. Kennedy.
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demanded administrative supervision dedicated to the utilization of
social research and planning as instruments of federal policy to
ensure the perpetuation of the welfare state in the modern era.

Therefore,

before he turned from domestic to international policy, Roosevelt
called upon his new political elite for assistance in the reorganization
of the executive branch of government which, if realized, would
promote and secure a viable continuation of the positive state.
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CHAPTER VI
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE CIRCULATION OF THE NEW ELITE
When Franklin Roosevelt gave Charles Merriam of the National Resource
Conrnittee (NRC) executive approval in early 1936 to focus on the
problem of executive reorganization, 1 the intellectual elite of experts
and social science orientated academics had already become an established
part of the federal bureaucracy.

As illustrated in the previous

chapter, this new elite was largely responsible for the creation of
federal policy which enlarged the responsibilities of the national
government from regulator to guarantor of the interdependent social and
economic sectors of American society.

By 1936 the focus of federal

policy was clearly evident, as was the completion of the circulation of
_the new elite which had fostered this new role for the national
government.

Consistent with the elitist perspective in the United States,

the evolution of both this elite and the enlarged role of the federal
govetnment was gradual and non-violent.

The process took the greater

part of two deacdes to evolve and become an integral facet of the
American system.

Once the framework of this new organization of personnel

and policy was realized, a reorganization, involving the structure and
function of the administrative branch of the federal government was
necessary to promote a viable leadership to direct and perpetuate the
fledgling welfare state.

Robert ·. Michels, almost a century earlier, had

observed this tendency of the leadership class to develop a structured

102
and well-defined executive body in all large organizations. 2 And
such was the case for the New Dealers in 1936.

With the move to

reorganize the executive branch in 1936, Roosevelt sought to secure
a leadership capable of administering the positive welfare state,
and supervising its continuance into the future.
By moving to

~organize

the executive department in 1936, Roosevelt

not only recognized the need for restructuring the administrative
network vastly complicated by the influx of New Deal agencies, but
also continued almost a century's work on executive administrative
reform. 3 The history of the concerted efforts for .reorganization dates
to the post-bellum period of the Civil War when congressional investigative
conmittees analyzed the administrative structure in an attempt to establish
an executive branch streamlined to the needs of the legislature and
to the exigencies of the economy. 4 These efforts failed to formulate
the necessary legislation for reorganization as neither the inquiry nor
the intent received presidential sanction.

It was not until 1905

when Theodore Roosevelt appointed the Keep Conmission to study executive
administration that responsibility for reorganization transferred from
the congressional to executive branches and set the precedent for the
executive branch to oversee its own operations. 5 This transference of
reorganizational initiative significantly altered the nature of the
intended reform.

The major congressional assumptions underlying

reorganization in the nineteenth century held that economy based upon
efficient method would result in effective government produced by a
minimal capital expenditure,

On the other hand, the executive stance

gave efficiency a co-equal status with economy insisting that the method
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of expenditure was as important as the amount expended. 6 These two
concepts, economy and efficiency, preoccupied .the advocates of reorgani11

11

zation throughout the initial decades of the twentieth century when the
principle of scientific management guided the mechanics of all large
organizations--including government. 7
The first enactments of executive reorganizations came from the
administratio~s of William Taft and Woodrow Wilson. 8 Taft, on the basis
of the recommendations from his Commission on Economy and Efficiency,*
sequestered from Congress authority to bring about needed transfers among
the executive agencies. 9 Wilson pursoed a similar course. By the
authorizations stipulated by the Overman Act of 1917, reflecting the
wartime emergency of World War I, Wilson received broad powers to redistribute the functions of ex~cutive agencies. 10 Although these authorizations established the beginnings of executive reorganization, they
niggardly reflected the intentions of the Commission on Economy and
Efficiency which greatly influenced both Taft and Wilson. 11 Budgetary
programs were still' non-existent in the federal government where all
monetary transactions, in terms of appropriations and expenditures, were
controlled by Congress.

To the Commission, the existing system lacked

the prerequisites needed for effective administration, and recommended
the immediate enactment of a budgetary system.

Taft and Wilson promoted

its implementation, but Congress stood steadfast in objection.
*Taft cotmlissioned prominent political scientists to staff his
Commission on Economy and Efficiency. Its membership included:
Frederick A. Cleveland, Director, New York Bureau of Municipal Research;
W. F. Willoughby, Director, Institute for Government Research; W. l~.
Warwick, Frank Goodnow, Henry Chase, Merritt 0. Chance, all eminent
political scientists. Rexford Tugwell, The Enlargement of the
Presidency (New York, 1960), p. 398.
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The widescale expenditures of the First World War drastically
weakened congressional opposition.

When the war was over, the incurred

debts and the burdens of increased tax payments proved too cumbersome
for congressional suprevision.

Therefore, in order to ensure economy

and efficiency in the handling of financial transactions, Congress
I

passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 which created the Bureau of
the Budget and the Office of the -Comptroller. 12 With the enactment of
this piece of legislation, budgetary policy became an effective tool of
administration in the federal government.

Congress, however, did not

relinquish all of its former power over financial concerns to the
executive branch.

As one historian notes:

. . . The Comptroller General would become a serious limitation
on the presidential power . . . . It was a good principle that
Congress should scrutinize Executive performance; and the
Comptroller General was thus made an officer responsible
to the Congress, with the duty of reporting on the use of
appropriated funds. What was not expected was that the
enormous power of an irremovable official would be used to
establish a system of pre-audits which, in effect, could
seriously limit the President's constitutional duty to see
that the laws were faithfully executed. Mccarl, the first
Comptroller General, took it upon himself to say what might
or might not be done with appropriated funds. He demanded
to be satisfied with the Executive's intentions and would
approve no warrants uritil he looked into the elaborate
submissions he demanded.13
Although the Twenties provided negligible additions to the scope
of executive reorganization, the implementations of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 provided for a more coherent management of federal
finances, and in this manner enlarged presidential control of the departments and agencies of the executive branch. 14 The Bureau of the Budget,
housed in the Treasury Department, was made clearly subordinate to the
President, and its Director was made responsible to him by the provisions

105

of the law.

The chief function of the Bureau was to fonnulate a

financial plan for the current year based upon presidential policy
and estimates from the budget officers serving each executive department
or agency.

In this regard,
the President
exercised a greater control
.
.

over the departments under his supervision as the Director of the
Budget recorded all department operations requiring funding, and
provided the President with a blueprint of all administrative
modifications and changes.

At times the Comptroller General hindered

the execution of presidential policy, but at least the chief executive
was afforded the advantage of a semi-cohesive instrument of administration
via the Bureau of the Budget.

By the time Franklin Roosevelt assumed office in the Spring of 1933,
the administrative network of the executive branch had chiefly the same
structure as that of 1921 save for the additions of a few executive
agencies like the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and the
Federal Fann Board (FFB).
advant~ges

Roosevelt had a long time interest in the

of administrative reform.

During his tenure as Governor of

New York, he staunchly supported the ideals of executive reorganization~ 5
As President, Roosevelt envisioned reorganization as primarily an
efficiency measure with little economy to be expected.

In this appraisal

of reorganization, he made a significant break with his predecessors
who saw reorganization as a means to cut the federal budget as well as
a provision for efficient government.

On the subject of administrative

reform, Roosevelt stated early in his presidency:
, , .it's awfully erroneous to assume that it is in the
reorganization of Departments and Bureaus' that you save
money. That is a very easy fallacy to fall into. Where
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you save money is by lopping off debts and lopping off
employees and the spending of money. Savings through
reorganization, at best, would be a drop in the bVgket.
The reason for reorganization is good management.
The national economic emergency took top priority during Roosevelt's
first term in office, and, as a result, the questions of extensive
executive reorganization were virtually ignored.* Although reorganization
was momentarily postponed, the events of Roosevelt's first term in
office shaped the temper of his later reorganization program which
preoccuped his second administration.

Th~

dictates of the emergency

demanded administrative strength in the areas of budget, personnel, and
planning.

As the New Deal took shape in the early years of Roosevelt's

first administration, the .budget, personnel, and planning increasingly
became integral parts in the establishment of the welfare state.

And

when Roosevelt focused on the issues of reorganization in his second
term, these administrative concerns expanded the dimensions of his
previous conceptions on administrative management.
During the initial days of the New Deal, Roosevelt followed the
traditional and orthodox policy of economic recovery--fiscal retrenchment
and budget-balancing.

The Economy Act of 1933 attests to this Rooseveltian

view which sought recovery through the curta i 1ment of government
expenditures. 17
*Although the Economy Act of 1933 authorized the President to
transfer agencies and bureaus, Roosevelt seldom used it. He issued
seven executive orders which effected little change: he established
the Office of National Parks and the Division of the Territories in
the Department of the Interior; he abolished the U.S. Geographic
Board and the Office of Alien Properties, and incorporated their duties
in o.t her departments and agencies; and he completely cancelled the
U.S. Shipping Board and the Federal Employment Stabilization Board.
Richard Po lenburg, Reorganizing Roos eve 1t •s Government (Cambridge,
1966)' pp. 8-9.
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After his initial retrenchment policy, however, Roosevelt, on the .
recoirmendations of his advisers, promoted recovery through the expansion
of federal services. 18 In order not to burden the existing departments
and agencies, Roosevelt created new ones to implement the policies of
the first hundred days legislation.

The AAA, NRA, TVA, PWA, HOLC, FDIC

and other instruments of th early New Deal program both enlarged the
administrative structure and greatly expanded the scope of federal
services.

Wtih the emergence of these alphabetic agencies, and because

of the nature of the depression which necessitated them, the budget,
as an instrument of executive administration, became a significant tool
of the presidency.

Not only did Roosevelt utilize it in its traditional

function as a projector of fiscal policy, but he also relied on it as
a mechanism for "maintaining the economy . . . , for continuing improvement
of operations, and for helping to make and enforce many decisions of the
presidential office. 1119 With the establishment of the welfare state by
the measures of the second hundred days legislation of 1935, epitomized
by the Social Security Act, the President's reliance on the budget, as
an instrument of social and economic policy, was of paramount importance.
· Because of this reliance on budgetary policy, the actions of the
Comptroller-General served as a serious handicap to the implementation
of executive policy. 20 The Comptroller-General derived his power from
his practice of preauditing proposed expenditures by federal agencies
and departments.

In order to avoid possible disallowance, the cabinet

budget officers occasionally requested a pre-audit to determine the
legality of an expenditure.

Such procedures delayed administrative

action until the Comptroller-General reached a decision, often bogging
1

I

-,

·,
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down executive enactment indefinitely.

Richard Polenburg notes the

New Dealers's reaction to such practices:
New Dealers fully reciprocated this hostility. They denounced
Mccarl as a petty tyrant, who indulged in legal hair-splitting,
arbitrarily held up needed funds, and snarled administration
in reams of red tape. They complained that Mccarl harrassed
the TVA and failed dismally to provide Congress with an
in tell i gi ble account of government operations. Administrators
muttered that Mccarl was "a reactionary Republican,"
surrounded by a "group of red-tape artists" whose "officials
intenneddl ing" caused great damage.21
·
When Roosevelt considered executive reorganization during his second
administration, both budgetary reform and the functions of the ComptrollerGeneral would be the focus of widescale attention and investigation.
In terms of the personnel which staffed the agencies and departments
of the New Deal, Roosevelt demonstrated a remarkable ability to mobilize
a host of intellectuals and professionals in Washington to direct the
course back to recovery. 22 In order to effect this swift mobilization,
Roosevelt deliberately bypassed the Civil Service Commission whose function
·was to man the federal bureaucracy. 23 During this period, the Commission
was months behind in its work, controlled by obsolete testing and registers,
and subject to veteran preferance.

The emergency demanded qui ck federal

.

entry not only to the existing bureaucracy but to the new agencies as well .
As a result, more than four-fifths of the quarter of a million federal
employees hi.red during Roosevelt's first administration were exempted
from civil service regulations. 24 Such a practice was an emergency or
temporary measure at best.

With the progression of New Deal policy which

greatly enlarged the scope of federal responsibility and the federal
bureaucracy, a personnel system was needed that did more than just make
"certain, barring revolution, war or economic disaster, the chosen
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dullards could have a long, uneventful, thoroughly secure working
life. 1125
Roosevelt's attempts at coordination and planning among the bureaucracy of the executive branch failed repeatedly during his initial
administration to bring about a cohesive and coherent executive policy.
Instead, the formative years of the New Deal were typically characterized
by the overlapping of duties, the contradiction of policy from one agency
to the next, and the failure of the administration to respond to any
widescale program of policycoor-ctination. 26 As in the other areas of
administrative management, the dictates of executive efficiency were
relegated to a position secondary to that of the national economic
emergency.

But "if Roosevelt was willing to defer systematic administra-

tive improvement, other New Deal sympathizers regarded it with more
urgency. 1127 Throughout his association with the National Resource
Conmittee (NRC), Charles Merriam urged for policy planning that would
lead not only to more efficient administration, but to more advanced social
and economic planning as well. 28 And as the New Deal scaled to size,
Roosevelt turned to Merriam, in early 1936, to begin the long overdue
task of forging some sense of coherency in the administrative operations.
The problems and questions concerning the budget, the personnel system,
and the functions of planning completed the agenda of Roosevelt's first
comprehensive investigation of executive reorganization. 29 This agenda,
streamlined to the needs of both the administrative policies of the New
Deal and the personnel which created these policies, consolidated those
factors of leadership necessary to perpetuate and direct the new governmental
organization of the welfare state.
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_on March 20, 1936, Roosevelt sent letters of appointment to his
Cornnittee on Executive Reorganization to Charles Merriam,* Louis
Brownlow,** and Luther Gulick.*** This very choice of membership
ensured both presidential involvement and .acceptance as both Roosevelt
and these chief cornnittee directors shared similar ideas on the aims and
purposes of the New Deal policies and the goals of reorganization.

As

one historian cornnents:
*Charles Merriam was educated in political science at Columbia
University, taught at the University of Chicago 1900-1924, helped
establish the Social Science Research Council in 1924, and served
as a member .on Herbert Hoover's Cornnission on Recent Social Trends
before_ unde. rtaking work on national planning during the New_ Deal with
the National Resource Cornnittee (NRC). See Barry Dean Karl, Executive
Reorganization and Reform jn the New Deal (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 37-81
for a :closer analysis of Merriam's work in politics and political
science.
**Louis Brownlow had a long history of involvement with public
administration. Having served as District Cornnissioner for Washington, D.C.
(1915-1920), and as city manager in both Petersburg and Knoxville,
Tennessee in the Twenties, Brownlow saw the need for the development
of public administration to train governmental personnel in the fields
of expertise necessary for public servants in the modern era. As a
result of this thinking, Brownlow established the Public Administration
Clearing House in Chicago--an institute dedicated to the goals of the
professionalization of public administration and the investigation of
government administration on all levels. See Karl, Executive Reorganization
and Reform in the New Deal, pp. 82-126 for an indepth profile of Louis
Brownlow.
***Luther Gulick, educated at Columbia University Graduate School
of Political Science, studied budgetary reform under Charles Beard,
E.R.A. Seligman, and Henry Seager. Dividing his time among Columbia,
the Training School for Public Service and the Bureau of Municipal
Reform, Gulick acquired a vast expertise in budgetary policy and
reform. From 1921 on, he served as the di rector of the Institute
of Public Administration in New York City. See Karl, Executive
Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal, pp. 127-165 for a
d1scuss1on of Gunck's professional 'life and accomplishments.
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Their political views closely corresponded to those of
the President. They were convinced that the American Presidency
represented the mo.st reliable bulwark against the tide of
totalitarianism, that it was "the institution around and behind
which democrats might rally to repel the enemy . . . To
demonstrate that freedom and efficiency were linked, that democratic societies could act with promptness and vigor, the
President must be given authority to match his responsibility.
Congress should concentrate on setting down general principles;
the President should be free to execute laws and administer
the government.30
11

With a staff of twenty-six experts, the Corrmittee worked throughout
the spring and surrmer of 1936 interviewing government personnel,
investigating the existing executive structure, and submitting progress
reports for evaluation and reconmendation. 31 Because of the nature
of the Corrmlttee's work, it was compiled in secrecy so as not to politically
damage Roosevelt's chances for reelection on grounds that he was attempting
some sort of "dictator coup" by promoting reorganization for his ·personal
advantage. 32 After the election of 1936 was over, the Corrmittee presented
its final report to Roosevelt.
The final report covered the areas of the budget, personnel,
and planning which had become the more significant levers of administrative
management of the welfare state.
following points:

Its recorrmendations comprised the

the appointment of six executive assistants to lighten

the burden of the president; a revitalization of the civil service by
the expansion of the merit system, i.ncreased salaries for federal bureaucrats, Clld the replacement of the Civil Service Corrmission with an
administrator; budgetary planning by granting authority to control
accounts to the Executive, and the replacement of the Comptroller.. General
by providing Congress with an independent audit of all expenditures; the
establi.shment of the NRC as a permanent planning and coordinating body
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in the Executive branch; and the reorganization of the executive
branch by the creation of two additional departments--Publ ic Works and
Welfare--and the consolidation of all existing agencies and co111Tiissions
33
.
under one of these departments.
Roosevelt was in complete agreement
with these reco111Tiendations, and in early 1937 sent the proposals to
Congress for consideration and approval. 34
For two years the President's plansfor reorganization were
rejected by Congress, which saw the move as a usurpation of congressional
power in violation of the guidelines of the Constitution. 35 Although the
congressional battle against reorganization lasted the better part of
two years, Roosevelt persisted.

The Reorganization Act of 1939, though

considerably watered-down from the reco111Tiendations proposed in 1937,
at least gave Roosevelt a new and more efficient organization to manage.
As Tugwell notes:

"For the first time the Presidency, as an operating

mechanism, was something more than an informal group of assistants
surrounding a principal. 1136 During the Thirties, the presidency had
become a highly institutionalized conglomerate of responsibilites and
services which demanded a structure organized around the nature of
the institution. 37 Until 1939 no organized leadership, save for the
out-dated structure of the executive branch, existed in the federal
government.

With the implementation of the Reorganization Act at the

end of the decade, the era of the institutionalized presidency began-a presidency suited to the needs of the new organization of the positive
welfare state.
The Reorganization Act of 1939 created the Executive Office organized
around three management branches:

(1) Budget and Administrative
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Research; (2) Planning; (3) Personnel.

These three administrative

branches, together with the establishment of six positions of administrative assistants to serve the president, coflllrised the staff of the
Executive Office. 38
The Bureau of the Budget 39 was divided into four main divisions
dealing with the areas of management counsel, administrative and
fiscal reorganization, investigation, and defense.

Although Congress

had failed to abolish the office of the Comptroller-General, the
consolidation of the Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Office gave
the president control over the creation and implementation of fiscal
poltcy .
. The transfer to the Executive Office of the NRC--renamed the
National Resources Planning Board (NRPB)--established the objectives of
planning and research as an integral factor in federal policy-making. 40
Equipped with the statistical expertise accumulated in the Twenties and
Thirties, the NRPB served as an indicator .of social and economic trends.
As an investigative as well as planning body, the NRPBis primary function
was to prevent widescale economic crisis by constantly interpreting
the economic and social indicators.
forshadowed
years, 41

th~

In this capacity, the Board

formation of the Council of Economic Advisers in later

The creation of an effective personnel recruitment body presented
a challenge to Roosevelt. 42 Congress had failed to grant him the
authority to revise the civil service system, but the President surmounted
the rejection by appointing one of his administrative assistants as a
liason officer to the Civil Service Commission.

The liason officer
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provided the Conmission with reports on personnel deficiencies in various
fields. ;These reports were instrumental in expanding the merit
system in the deficient areas in order te ensure the necessary competency
in the federal bureaucracy.
With the establishment of these three arms of administrative
management, the top-level organizational framework of the executive branch
advanced to a new dimension and met the needs of the welfare state.

To

further the coordination of the lower-level organization of the executive
branch; Roosevelt established three new agencies:

the Federal Works

Agency; the Federal Security Agency; and the Federal Loan Agency. Under
them, he transferred all related bureaus and agencies. 43 Thus, by
the end of 1939, administrative reform, shaped by both its historical
tradition and the dictates of the New Deal, enlarged the capabilities
of the leadership in Washington, D. C. to guarantee the execution of ·
the federal responsibilities inherent in the welfare state.

Of this

reorganization, one student of government concludes:
The Reorganization Act of 1939 converts the Presidency into
an instrument of twentieth-century government; it gives the
incumbent a sporting chance to stand the strain and fulfill
his constitutional mandate as a one-man branch of our threepart government; it deflates even the most forceful arguments,
which are still raised occasionally, for a plural executive;
it assures us that the Presidency will survive the advent of
the positive state. Executive Order 8248 may yet be judged
to have saved the Presidency from paralysis and the Constitution
from radical amendment.44
Limited by Congress, Roosevelt achieved a remarkable success in
equipping the executive branch of government with the necessary tools to
perpetuate the new direction and relationship of the federal government
to the nation.

Created in the crisis of economic disaster in the early

Thirties, the institutions of the welfare state encumbered the existing
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administrative structure which in turn jeopardized the success of these
New Deal measures.

The Reorganization Act of 1939 eased this contradic-

tory situation between policy and administration, and secured the survival
of the welfare state.

More significantly, however, it assured the con-

tintiation or perpetuation of the new political elite of experts and intellectuals which had charted the course of federal policy throughout the
New [)eal years.

With an organizational structure to complement and support

the dictates of the utilization of social intelligence in a political
context, this new elite was assured of an active role in the policyand decision-making channels in the executive branch.

By 1935 the circula-

tion of this elite into the strongholds of the national government had
been realized; by the end of 1939 it was an integral factor in the
institutionalized organization of administrative leadership.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
"History is . . . stability, stagnation, and decay, and each of these
processes as well as historical change can be illuminated with the perspectives of elite theory. 111

Because of its universal assumption of ·

minority rule, the elitist perspective offers a useful historical meth.odology for the analytical operation which guides historical inquiry.

As

this mode of scholarship attempts to uncover and trace the development
of the centers of power and decision-making in the period under
investigation, it allows for a broad overview of the historical process.
In this manner, devoid of any dogmatic claims to a theory of history,
the elitist perspective performs a valuable task in the ongoing process
of historical interpretation and synthesis.
Viewing the New Deal within the parameters of the elitist perspective, one is able to discern the transitional role it played between the
political dictates of an earlier era and the political demands of the modern
age.

The Thirties marked the evolution in the federal government from its

traditional role of arbitrator or regulator of the nation's infrastructures
to that of guarantor of the social and economicorder.

The Great Depression

had precipitated this demand for the enlarged responsibilities of the
federal government, and the New Deal facilitated the transition.

Central

to this process of change and transition, which characterized the scope of
the New Deal, was the circulation into the federal government of a new elite
of

academics~

especially social science-orientated intellectuals.

Their
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impact was significant in terms of the legislation initiated and enacted,
although not all of the legislation itself proved successful in operation,
the added dimension of social planning and social research within the
federal government, and the restructuring of the administrative network
of the federal government with the Reorganization Act of 1939.
Although the national government progressed in its ability to meet
the challenges posed by the complex problems of the industrial order by
the end of the decade, much work was still left undone.

In many ways,

the proliferation of the New Deal programs, at their peak in mid-decade,
only underlined the pluralistic nature of the economic and social
disorders of the nation.

The solutions to massive unemployment, social

inequity, and political disenfranchisement posed problems for the new
elite of academics and social scientists, and these problems persisted
despite the New Deal and despite the new administrative framework
designed to ease the burdens of the management of the welfare state.
Nevertheless, despite the many shortcomings and failures of much of the
overall New Deal program, the New Deal did significantly alter the relationship between the government and the public.

In this respect, the New Deal

brought the federal government into the modern era by incorporating in"to
the channels of national decision-making a new elite equipped with methodologies based on

11

social intelligence which provided for at least the
11

potential for rectifying the social and economic disorders of the nation.
The New Deal ushered in a new chapter in the political history of
the United States.

With the realization of the welfare state and the

full implementation of the circulation of a new elite, a new set of
directives and policy concerns strongly influenced the course of federal
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politics.

Viewing the New Deal in this light, its failures can be

assessed as the shortcomings inherent in attempting new alternatives to
stabilize the economy and to promote social well being.

Some of these

New Deal failures, such as the programs of the NRA and AAA, fell drastically
short in their goals of stabilizing the economic order, but then the
emergency of the Depression at times forced the national government to
forfeit long-range plans in lieu of short-range gains to keep the
economy

afloat~

The establishment of the welfare state by the new elite of social
scientists and intellectuals had broad implications for the course of the
federal government during the World War II years as well as in the
post-war decades.

These implications, too numerous and complex to

analyze fully in these pages, are, nevertheless, important to mention
briefly as they point out the significance of the New Deal experiment
in the shaping of the contours of American History.

Some of these

outgrowths of the New Deal in the decades following the Thirties complete
the remainder of this chapter.
Before many of the domestic problems of the nation were adequately
assessed or resolved, the United States became involved in World War II.
As was the case for the First World War, the federal government required
a vastly expanded administrative staff to ensure a swift and efficiently
managed war mobilization.

Roosevelt mobilized "social scientists • . .

in key administrative posts, where their analytical skills were useful
for the difficult and complex problems of managing the war effort. 112

In

many respects, the war effort culminated in theory and practice much of the
work promoted .by social scientists during the New Deal. 3 The war, by its
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enonnous requirements, forced the government to develop and construct
a complete set of social and economic indicators that took into account
the whole of the economy.
achieved in

th~ . economic

Because of this great advancements were
assessment of the potentials and possibilities

implicit in the laws of economic growth which would govern the economy
after the war.

From the data compiled in the work of the War Production

Board (WPB), the Office of the Price Administration (OPA), the War Labor
Board, the War Manpower Commission, the Treasury Department , and the
Bureau of the Budget, economists, statisticians, and other social
scientists assimilated vast amounts of economic and social data pertinent
to the management of a peacetime economy.

Therefore, in late 1944, the

federal government established the Office of War Mobilization and
Reconversion (OWMR) as it was recognized "that intelligent planning for
reconversion was dependent to a large extent upon a more effective
administrative pattern for. waging war. 114 This move to centraliied
planning for the reconverted economy helped ward off a repetition of an
economic recession which crippled the nation after the conclusion of the
First World War.
As was the case for many of the social science programs established
to execute the wartime policy of World War I, the end of the Second World
War saw the demise of many of the social science research and analysis
programs in the federal government. 5 But here the similarities stop.
Before the start of the Second World War,
were an integral

p~rt

social scientists and intellectuals

of the federal bureaucracy, and, at the war's conclu-

sion, they still held on to many of the reins of power inherent in the
decision-making process in the federal government.

Although the war
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machinery was dismantled, the basic framework of welfare state government
remained.
The war created "centralizing tendencies" in the federal government ,
which, during the course of the initial post-war decade, reinforced the
infrastructures of ,the welfare state.

This "crucial post war decade

tested the viability of the welfare state hypothesis on a peacetime
economy operating in a prosperous capacity.

Initially the fear of a

postwar recession molded the popular acceptance of a government regulated
economy. 6 In response to this fear, Congress, in 1946, passed the Employment Act which established a Council of Economic Advisers which provided
the President with a professional staff of economists to oversee the
matters of fiscal and monetary policy.

This measure significantly altered

the ad hoc and informal relationship which economists had shared with the
President during the New Deal.

With the establishment of the Council

of Economic Advisers, this relationship between the President and his
economic counsel was formalized and institutionalized within the Executive
office and insured the consideration of economic polity within the scope
of national decision-making.
The welfare state, as created by the New Deal, conbined economic
concerns with the formulation of social policy, and during the post war
decade the social policy of the fledgling welfare state was expanded.

The

Fair Deal of Harry Truman intated and established a "comprehensive public
housing program, revised upward social security benefits and extended
coverage, increased the minimum wages, tightened . price supports for farmers,
and expanded programs for soil conservation, flood control, rural electrification, public power, and issued government assistance to veterans for
education, homes and businesses. 7
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By the end of the Forties, domestic issues shared the limelight
with growing international concerns.

The establishment of the United

Nations, and the growing threat of conmunist encroachment on the Western
world prevented an American isolationist policy. As leader of the "free"
world contingent in the international forum, the United States was faced
with fonnulating continuous international policy.

To facilitate the

formulation of foreign policy, the federal government, in 1947, established
the National Security Council which "provided a channel through which .
systematic studies of American foreign and military strategy entered the
orbit of presidential power directly rather than through the diluting
avenues of departmental positions papers. 118 With this position in international affairs, an added dimension of federal responsibility was placed
within the scope of the welfare state.

Not only was the federal government,

and more explicitly the presidential orbit, entrusted with the responsibilities of the social and economic order, but with the international order
as well.

After 1950, these responsibilities of the federal government

would shape the contours of presidential leadership.
The significance of the Eisenhower Administration regarding domestic
issues was in its general acceptance of the directives of the welfare state.
As Eric Goldman notes:
The new direction was plain in the highway, school, slumclearance, medical insurance, and widened social security
bills sent to Congress. They were decidely un-New Dealish
in the amounts of money called .for, some of the methods proposed, and to the extent to which the Administration pressed
for their passage. But they were also decidely non-Taftian
in their assumption that the federal government had to assume
res pons i bil ity for broad social needs. So far as the amount
of expenditure was concerned, the programs would raise federal
spending in these categories to an annual level four billion
dollars higher than it had been under Truman.9
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Although the Eisenhower Administration curtailed recruitment from the
mobilized elite of academics and social scientists in Washington, 10
i.t perfonned a remarkable "holding action" in the continuation of welfare
policies.*
The international tension of the Fifties prompted Eisenhower to
expand federal programs to deal with the ever increasing possibilities of
the outbreak of another war.

During this period, there was a growing

reliance on presidential advisers and the expansion of the Executive office
through the incorporation of new agencies for scientific research. 11
The inception of the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and the
President's Science Advisory Corrmittee (PSAC) were largely instrumental
in developing the scientific and educational policies which preoccupied
the nation after the USSR's launching of the Sputnik.

The OST and the

PSAC brought together the experitse of scientists and social scientists
within the Presidential orbit in order to formulate domestic and foreign
policy as necessitated by the nuclear age.

By the close of Eisenhower's

tenure in office, the responsibilities of the federal government in the
postwar age were clearly defined as the guarantor of the domestic social
and economic order and as the promoter of international stability abroad.
During the Sixties, a prolifieration of social programs emerged on
the domestic scene which had been sorely neglected in lieu of the more
pressing international ivolvements of the previous decade.

These new

programs included the war on poverty, the refurbishing of urban America,
the expansion of educational and health opportunities. and a reassessment of
*Much of the blacklisting of intellectuals during the Fifties was
an outgrowth of Mc~arthyism.
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civil rights which had long been ignored by the federal government. 12
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations employed social scientists in
increasing numbers in task forces to analyze the social problems of the
nation and to provide recomnendations for improvement.

The Sixties wit-

nessed a resurgence in domestic and social reform, and in many ways
brought to fruition the attempts of the New Dealers.

From the New

Frontier through the close of the Great Society, this remobilized elite
sought to distribute the fruits of the prosperity of the age through the
expansion of social and economic equality.
On the international front, The Vietnam war side-tracked the
attention of the academic elite which caused for wide clevages among the
ruling elite.

In the initial years of the. involvement there had been

widespread elite support for American involvement in Vietnam, but in the
years that followed this consensus developed into reassessments of the
American posture in the war and reco1J111endations for withdrawal. 13 By the
end of the decade, much disillusionment swept across the country manifesting
itself in race riots, violent demonstrations againstthe war; and the
youth opting for alternative life-styles with the counter-culture.

There

was a national reawakening--a wholesale questioning of the directives of
federal policies in international affairs.
The easing out of the war during the initial years of the Seventies
cooled domestic tensions, .and for a while returned attentions to domestic
issues and policies.

But the uncovering of the Watergate scandal and

the subsequent resignation of Richard Nixon added to the climate of
national disillusionment sparked by the Vietnam involvement.

This

disillusionment in both domestic and foreign operations, around which the
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· res pons i bi 1it i es of presidential power had been focused in the post-war
era, has led to the questioning of the centralized decision-inaking
process in the federal government, the instrument of the welfare state.
In the forty years since the incorporation of the welfare state,
and the implementation of an elite of academics and social scientists into
the federal government, a general acceptance of the directives of
welfare capitalism has withstood the test of time.

Whereas the Thirties

marked the growth in the scope of federal responsibilities, perhaps the
Seventies will witness a trend toward the accountability for the assumption
of such responsibility.

And according to the elitist perspective,

inherent in the process of historical change, is the shift in the
composition of the ruling elite.

,·
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